Models for Proving Liability of School and Housing Officials in School Desegregation Cases by Dee, Thomas M. & Huggins, Norella V.
Urban Law Annual ; Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law
Volume 23
January 1982
Models for Proving Liability of School and
Housing Officials in School Desegregation Cases
Thomas M. Dee
Norella V. Huggins
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Urban Law Annual ; Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law by an authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more
information, please contact digital@wumail.wustl.edu.
Recommended Citation
Thomas M. Dee and Norella V. Huggins, Models for Proving Liability of School and Housing Officials in School Desegregation Cases, 23
Urb. L. Ann. 111 (1982)
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol23/iss1/4
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Scholars' have recognized and courts2 have acknowledged the in-
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1. See Farley, Residential Segregation and Its Implicationsfor Integration, 39 LAW
AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 164, 165, 167 (1975) (levels of racial residential segregation in
the largest metropolitan areas are very high; thus, schools organized on a neighbor-
hood basis will remain racially segregated indefinitely); Taeuber, Demographic Per-
spectives on Housing and School Segregation, 21 WAYNE L. REv. 833, 842-43 (1975)
(the changing racial composition of a school's pupils and staff serves as signal to real-
tors and homeseekers; buyers consider attendance lines in housing decisions). See
generally F. WILSON & K. TAEUBER, RESIDENTIAL AND SCHOOL SEGREGATION:
SOME TESTS OF THEIR ASSOCIATION (1978); Orfield, If Wishes Were Houses Then
Busing Could Stop 21 (March, 1977) (Paper prepared for Conference on School De-
segregation in Metropolitan Areas, N.I.E.) (school and housing policies are intimately
related both in building and dismantling ghettoes). But see Wolf, Northern School
Desegregation and Residential Choice, 1977 Sup. CT. REv. 63, 66 (1977) (evidence
flimsy that racial composition of schools has corresponding effect on residential
patterns).
2. See, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1 (Denver), 413 U.S. 189, 202 (1973)
(earmarking schools according to race may have profound reciprocal effect on racial
composition of residential neigbborhoods within metropolitan area); Swanm v. Char-
lotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 21 (1971) (discriminatory siting or closing
of schools may promote segregated residential patterns that further lock the school
system into mold of racial separation); Adams v. United States (St. Louis), 620 F.2d
1277, 1291 (8th Cir.) (public perception of racial identity of a school a powerful factor
in shaping neighborhood residential patterns), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 826 (1980);
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terplay between residential and school segregation. Until recently,
however, courts have only held school officials accountable for the
direct effects in the schools of their constitutional violations.3 Fur-
thermore, in the past, school plaintiffs have not charged housing offi-
cials with contributing to segregated schools.4 Consequently, school
United States v. Board of School Comm'rs (Indianapolis), 573 F.2d 400, 408 (7th Cir.
1978) (racial composition of residential neighborhoods directly affects composition of
neighborhood schools; conversely, racial composition of schools can affect residential
patterns); Penick v. Columbus Bd. of Educ., 429 F. Supp. 229, 259 (S.D. Ohio 1977)
(interaction of housing and schools operates to promote segregation in each), affd,
583 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1978), a27'd, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); Reed v. Rhodes (Cleveland),
422 F. Supp. 708, 789 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (interrelation of housing and school patterns
an accepted fact of life), remandedfor reconsideration, 559 F.2d 1220 (6th Cir. 1977);
Hart v. Community School Bd. (Brooklyn), 383 F. Supp. 699, 709 (E.D. N.Y.) (hous-
ing and school patterns feed each other, segregated schools discourage middle class
whites from moving in), modoed, 383 F. Supp. 769 (E.D. N.Y. 1974), aft'd, 512 F.2d
37 (2d Cir. 1975) (recommended dismissal of housing defendants because no liability
determined); Morgan v. Hennigan (Boston), 379 F. Supp. 410,420 (D. Mass.) (schools
and neighborhoods have a reciprocal effect on one another; a school will cause racial
composition of neighborhood to shift and vice versa), afj'dsub nom. Morgan v. Kerri-
gan, 509 F.2d 580 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975); Crow v. Brown
(Atlanta), 332 F. Supp. 382, 391 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (one consequence of discriminatory
public housing is inability to achieve school desegregation), a'd, 457 F.2d 788 (5th
Cir. 1972), disapproved on other grounds in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 244-45
n.12 (1976).
3. See, e.g., Reed v. Rhodes (Cleveland), 455 F. Supp. 546, 550, 554, 557 (N.D.
Ohio), 455 F. Supp. 569 (N.D. Ohio 1978), aI'd inpart and remanded, 607 F.2d 714
(6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 935 (1980) (systemwide school remedy ordered
because school board intentionally segregated a substantial portion of students, teach-
ers, and facilities; by racially identifying schools, defendants substantially caused resi-
dential segregation); Morgan v. Hennigan (Boston), 379 F. Supp. at 470, 481
(systemwide school remedy ordered for school board's discriminatory faculty assign-
ments, school siting and expansion, feeder patterns, and transfer policy; court ac-
knowledged such acts may have contributed to population shifts); Bradley v. Milliken
(Detroit), 338 F. Supp. 582, 587, 592 (E.D. Mich. 1971) (school board's intentional
acts caused city school segregation; these acts also linked to those of other govern-
mental units in causing residential segregation), 345 F. Supp. 914 (E.D. Mich. 1972),
aft'd inpart, vacated and remanded in part on other grounds, 484 F.2d 215 (6th Cir.
1973), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
4. See, e.g., Adams v. United States (St. Louis), 620 F.2d at 1291 (extensive evi-
dence of governmental housing discrimination shown although no housing defend-
ants were before the court); Bradley v. Milliken (Detroit), 338 F. Supp. at 582, 592
(judge concluded that federal, state, and local housing actions established pattern of
residential segregation throughout metropolitan area that led to segregated schools;
no government housing defendants in the case); Crow v. Brown (Atlanta), 332 F.
Supp. at 391 (housing defendant only charged with housing discrimination although




and housing desegregation law evolved along separate lines.5
More recently, evidence of housing discrimination has begun to
play a major role in school cases.6 School defendants asserted, often
unsuccessfully, that residential segregation beyond their control
caused segregated neighborhood schools.7 Plaintiffs then began to
show that such segregation was not merely defaclo,s but rather re-
sulted from intentional racial discrimination by governmental hous-
ing actors.9 Justice Stewart added further impetus to the growing
5. See notes 89-94 and accompanying text infra.
6. See, e.g., United States v. Board of School Comm'rs (Indianapolis), 637 F.2d
1101, 1108-11 (7th Cir.) (discriminatory siting of public housing helped justify in-
terdistrict school remedy), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 838 (1980); Evans v. Buchanan (Wil-
mington), 555 F.2d 373, 389-90 (3rd Cir. 1977) (interdistrict school remedy supported
in part by segregative state and local housing policies), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 800
(1977); United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 518 F. Supp. 191, 193 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(plaintiffs alleged school segregation a consequence of housing agency discrimina-
tion); Bell v. Board of Educ. (Akron), 491 F. Supp. 916, 918 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (plan-
tiffs alleged city-wide discrimination in housing caused school segregation).
7. See, e.g., Liddell v. Board of Educ. (St. Louis), 469 F. Supp. 1304, 1326 (E.D.
Mo. 1979), rev'd and remanded sub nont Adams v. United States (St. Louis), 620 F.2d
1277 (8th Cir. 1980); Penick v. Columbus Bd. of Educ., 429 F. Supp. at 259; Reed v.
Rhodes (Cleveland), 422 F. Supp. at 789-90; Arthur v. Nyquist (Buffalo), 415 F. Supp.
904, 968 (N.D. N.Y. 1976), aft'd, 573 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
860 (1978); Morgan v. Hennigan (Boston), 379 F. Supp. at 470. See note 162 and
accompanying text infra.
8. In Keyes v. School Dist. No. I (Denver), 413 U.S. at 208, the Supreme Court
recognized two forms of segregation: "We emphasize that the differentiating factor
between de jure segregation and so-called de facto segregation. . . ispurpose or in-
tent to segregate." Id Thus, nonstatutory segregation will be considered defacto
unless plaintiffs can show that it resulted from the intentionally discriminatory acts of
public officials. Only intentional (de jure) discrimination violates the Constitution
and warrants a remedy. Recent Developments, Constitutional Law-Equal Protection
and the Neighborhood School Concept: The Demise of the De Jure-De Facto Distinc-
tion, 55 WASH. L. REV. 735, 737-38 (1980).
9. See Evans v. Buchanan (Wilmington), 393 F. Supp. at 436-38 (plaintiffs alleged
and court found that government housing policies assisted, encouraged, and author-
ized public and private discrimination in housing, causing interdistrict school segrega-
tion, justifying an interdistrict school remedy).
One author stated that plaintiffs in Milliken attempted to reduce the distinctions
between defacto and dejure to meaninglessness. Beer, The Nature of the Violation
and the Scope of the Remedy. An Analysis of Milliken v. Bradley in Terms of the
Evaluation of the Theory ofthe Violation, 21 WAYNE L. REv. 903, 904-07 (1975). Beer
noted that plaintiffs decided to introduce large amounts of evidence to show that
school officials had carried patterns of segregation in housing into the schools. Id at
904. The district judge did find that segregative actions by housing officials as well as
school officials played a substantial role in promoting segregation. 338 F. Supp. at
592. Thus the plaintiffs won the trial court's acceptance of the novel theory that gov-
1982]
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importance of housing evidence in school cases through his concur-
rence in Milliken v. Bradley (Detroit)."° He suggested that inten-
tional government housing acts may justify a school desegregation
remedy."
Justice Stewart's dictum implied that intentional housing viola-
tions may have dual effects: they .can cause segregated housing and
segregated schools. Subsequent cases utilized Justice Stewart's dic-
tum to find that housing violations justified a school remedy. 2
Courts have also recognized that intentional school violations may
cause housing and school effects.' 3 Further, courts affirmed and liti-
gants proposed hybrid models of liability. These hybrid models re-
flect the dual housing and school effects of intentional school or
housing violations.' 4 Because the hybrid models attempt to merge
ermuental housing discrimination and the failure of school officials to respond to it
could provide a basis for school desegregation. Beer at 905. However, plaintiffs
dropped the theory at the appellate level. Id at 907. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the
defendant's liability based on traditional dejure school board actions. 484 F.2d at
242; Beer at 907.
10. 418 U.S. at 755 (Stewart, J., concurring).
11. Id "Were it to be shown. . . that state officials had contributed to the separa-
tion of the races. .. by purposeful, racially discriminatory use of state housing or
zoning laws,. . . then transfer of pupils across district lines or. . . restructuring of
district lines might well be appropriate." Id
12. See United States v. Board of School Comm'rs (Indianapolis), 637 F.2d at
1108-09 (four-part test for determining when housing discrimination will support in-
terdistrict school remedy under Justice Stewart's principle); Evans v. Buchanan (Wil-
mington), 393 F. Supp. at 438 (governmental conduct causing racial disparity of
residential and school population between Wilmington and suburbs conforms to Jus-
tice Stewart's Milliken concurrence). The Supreme Court has never considered
whether governmental housing discrimination, absent intentional school segregation,
may justify a school desegregation remedy. The Court let stand two interdistrict
school remedies based, in part, on housing discrimination. Because school violations
also supported these remedies, Supreme Court acceptance of the housing liability
base remains uncertain. See United States v. Board of School Comm'rs (Indianapo-
lis), 637 F.2d at 1114, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 838 (1980); Evans v. Buchanan (Wilming-
ton), 393 F. Supp. at 438, 445, a'dmem., 423 U.S. 963 (1975), 416 F. Supp. at 339,
343 (interdistrict remedy), af'd, 555 F.2d at 376, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 800 (1977).
13. See, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1 (Denver), 413 U.S. at 202 (school board
actions that earmark schools according to race may have profound reciprocal effect
on racial composition of residential neighborhoods within a metropolitan area,
thereby causing further racial concentration within schools); Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. at 21 (discriminatory siting or closing of schools
may promote segregated residential patterns that further lock the school system into
racial separation); Reed v. Rhodes (Cleveland), 455 F. Supp. at 567 (school board
defendants helped to create racially segregated neighborhoods).




the separate standards of school and housing cases, which include
some elements not clearly defined, they pose new difficulties for liti-
gants and judges.' 5 Nevertheless, the new models also provide ex-
panded opportunities to reach the segregative effects of constitutional
violations. Consequently, they afford new flexibility in remedying
school segregation through housing programs.' 6
The following section will analyze the five liability models that ap-
pear in school cases. It will present a pure school model, a pure hous-
ing model, and three hybrid models derived from the pure models.
The last section will apply these five models to allegations filed in
Liddell v. Board of Education,'7 a St. Louis, Missouri metropolitan
school desegregation case. In applying these models, this note will
illustrate how the inclusion of all five forms of liability can broaden
the range of school and housing remedies.
LIABILITY MODELS
I. PURE SCHOOL MODEL
School desegregation cases traditionally have focused on the inten-
include the dual school and housing effects of intentional violations. These include
housing acts causing school effects; school acts causing housing effects that cause
school effects; and school acts causing housing effects. See, e.g., United States v.
Board of School Comm'rs (Indianapolis), 637 F.2d at 1114, 1116 (Indianapolis hous-
ing authority's discriminatory siting of public housing caused segregative housing and
school effects throughout area of authority; court based interdistrict school remedy in
part upon this ground); United States v. Texas Educ. Agency (Lubbock), 600 F.2d
518, 527 (5th Cir. 1979) (if school board's segregative acts in some schools helped
establish housing patterns that caused segregation in other schools, the status of the
other schools violates constitution); Andrews v. City of Monroe, 513 F. Supp. 375, 392
(W.D. La. 1980) (if intentional acts of local school officials helped establish the resi-
dential patterns of a metropolitan area, then the segregated status of the schools vio-
lates the Constitution), at'dnarb ,aon Taylor v. Ouachita Parish School Bd., 648 F.2d
959 (5th Cir. 1981).
In Indianapolis, plaintiffs proposed a theory that the city school board's intradistrict
violations caused interdistrict housing and school effects, warranting an interdistrict
school remedy. They failed to offer persuasive proof, however. 637 F.2d at 1111-12.
See also United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 518 F. Supp. at 193 (plaintiffs alleged
that discriminatory housing acts caused city school segregation).
15. See notes 167-99 and accompanying text infra.
16. See notes 155-61, 200-06, 261-63, 279-83 and accompanying text infra.
17. 469 F. Supp. 1304 (E.D. Mo. 1979), rev'dsubnom. Adams v. United States (St.
Louis), 620 F.2d 1277 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 826, remanded, 491 F. Supp.
351 (E.D. Mo. 1980), aI'd, No. 80-1458, slip op. (8th Cir. Feb. 13, 1981), cert. denied,
50 U.S.L.W. 3447 (U.S. Dec. 1, 1981).
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tional actions of state and local school officials that cause racial im-
balance in schools.' Although school cases originated in states
segregated by statute,' 9 attention later shifted to proving intentional
segregation in non-statutory states.20 Thus, analysis of systemwide li-
ability begins with different considerations, depending on whether
plaintiffs bring suit in statutory or non-statutory states.
In statutorily-segregated states, Brown v. Board of Education2'
fixed the initial liability of state and local officials, making it unneces-
sary for plaintiffs to show any discriminatory intent of such offi-
cials.22 In non-statutory states, plaintiffs have the initial burden of
proving that school boards or the state intentionally segregated a
school system.23 In either case, the Court imposes an affirmative duty
on school boards to desegregate the resulting segregated or "dual"
systems.24  In both statutory and non-statutory states, interdistrict
18. See, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. I (Denver), 413 U.S. 189, 192 (1973) (Den-
ver school board built schools, gerrymandered attendance zones, and used "optional"
zones and mobile class units to deliberately segregate certain schools); Penick v. Co-
lumbus Bd. of Educ., 583 F.2d 787, 795 (6th Cir. 1978), aft'd, 443 U.S. 449 (1979)
(school board's segregative acts included opening one-race schools, gerrymandering
attendance zones, allowing permissive transfer of white students, and segregating fac-
ulties), Morgan v. Hennigan (Boston), 379 F. Supp. 410, 470,481 (D. Mass.), a1dsub
nom. Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 580 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963
(1975) (school board discriminated in school siting, faculty assignments, transfer poli-
cies, and feeder patterns).
For a general overview of school desegregation cases see D. BELL, RACE, RACISM
AND AMERICAN LAW (1980) and R. BROWNING, FROM BROWN TO BRADLEY:
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION: 1954-1974 (1975).
19. In Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I), the Supreme
Court held that state-mandated dual school systems which prohibited black students
from attending white schools violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Governmental separation by race denoted black inferiority, detrimental
to the education of black children. Thus, separate educational facilities are inherently
unequal. Id at 494-95. Until the 1970's, school desegregation cases were largely
limited to southern, statutorily segregated states. Penick v. Columbus Bd. of Educ.,
583 F.2d at 793.
20. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1 (Denver), 413 U.S. at 189, concerning school seg-
regation in Denver, Colorado, was the first case from a northern state, not segregated
by statute, brought before the Supreme Court.
21. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
22. Id at 495. Courts infer racial intent from the overt racial classification of the
statute. Note, Interdistrict Desegregation: The Remaining Options, 28 STAN. L. REV.
521, 523 n.15 (1976).
23. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1 (Denver), 413 U.S. at 208. See notes 28-35 infra.
24. In Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (Brown II), the court




remedies depend upon plaintiffs proving interdistrict violations or
effects.25
The first subsection will focus on the test for proving intentional,
systemwide school segregation in non-statutory states. The second
subsection will analyze the Supreme Court principles for interdistrict
liability applicable to statutory and non-statutory states. Then it will
apply these principles to single district segregation with multidistrict
effects.
A. Single District School Case
I. School Board Liability for Systemwide Segregation
In most non-statutory single district cases, the local board's liabil-
ity depends upon a finding that it intentionally caused system-wide
segregation.26 When statistics demonstrate racial imbalance, the
principal issue is whether the school board intentionally segregated a
"meaningful portion" of the distric 27 Courts have failed to clearly
define the meaning of "intent" or the measure of "meaningful."
Because many school officials do not openly express their purpose
nondiscriminatory school system. The district courts were to exercise their equitable
powers in considering the adequacy of desegregation plans. Id Later, the court made
clear that school boards operating dual systems at the time of Brown I were charged
with the affirmative duty to take whatever steps were necessary to convert to a unitary
system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated "root and branch." The
test of a plan would be its effectiveness. Green v. County School Bd. (New Kent
County), 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968).
Recently, the court re-emphasized that the equal protection clause aims at all offi-
cial actions, not just those of state legislatures. Thus, there is no constitutional differ-
ence between statutory dual systems and dual systems that result from the
intentionally segregative acts of local school officials. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v.
Penick, 443 U.S. at 457 n.5. In either case, the existence of a dual system in 1954
places an affirmative duty upon school boards to desegregate. Each instance of a
failure or refusal to fulfill this affirmative duty continues the violation of the four-
teenth amendment. Id at 458-59. See van Geel, Racial Discrimination from Little
Rock to Hareard, CIN. L. REv. 49, 68 (1980) (boards that once maintained dual sys-
tems must undo the damage they should have been undoing since 1954; "bygones are
not bygones").
25. See notes 50-55 and accompanying text infra.
26. See notes 27-40 and accompanying text infra.
27. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1 (Denver) 413 U.S. at 208 (where a meaningful
portion of the system is found to be intentionally segregated, subsequent or other
segregation in the system justifies imposing burden on school officials to prove that
this is not also the result of their intentional acts).
1982]
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to segregate, judges must infer intent from other sources.28 In the
past, courts have accepted evidence that the foreseeably segregative
effects of school siting or drawing of school attendance zones satisfied
equal protection intent standards.29  Recently, the Supreme Court
held that more than foreseeability is required.3" Plaintiffs must prove
that school boards made decisions partly because of, not merely with
knowledge of, the foreseeable segregative effects.3 In Village of Ar-
28. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242, (1976) (often necessary to infer
discriminatory purpose from totality of the facts, including disproportionate impact);
Keyes v. School Dist. No. I (Denver), 413 U.S. at 227 (Powell, J., concurring)
("murky, subjective judgments inherent in courts' search for segregative intent").
29. See, e.g., United States v. Texas Educ. Agency (Austin), 532 F.2d 380, 388
(5th Cir. 1976), vacated and remanded, 429 U.S. 990 (1976); Hart v. Community
School Bd., 512 F.2d 37, 49 (2d Cir. 1975); Oliver v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 508
F.2d 178, 182 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975); Cisneros v. Corpus
Christi School Dist., 467 F.2d 142, 148 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 920
(1973).
30. See, e.g., Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 536 n.9 (1979)
(Dayton II). The Court stated,
We have never held that as a general proposition the foreseeability of segregative
consequences makes out aprimafacie case of purposeful racial discrimination
and shifts the burden of producing evidence to the defendants if they are to es-
cape judgment; and even more clearly there is no warrant in our cases for hold-
ing that such foreseeability routinely shifts the burden of persuasion to the
defendants. Of course.. . proof of foreseeable consequences is one type of quite
relevant evidence of... purpose.
Id
31. In Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979), a sex discrimination case,
the Court rejected as insufficient the tort standard of holding an actor responsible for
the foreseeable consequences of his act. Id at 278. Foreseeability is a "working tool,
not a synonym for proof." Id at 279 n.25. To show intent, the proponent must
demonstrate that official action was taken partly "because of," not just "in spite of'
the adverse consequences. Id at 279. Not much more than foreseeability is required,
however. Id at 279 n.25. See Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. at 464-65
(foreseeability and disparate impact alone are insufficient, but may be relevant evi-
dence of the ultimate fact of intent).
Obviously, if judges inferred intent from foreseeable consequences alone, the de
facto/de jure distinction would collapse. In school settings, racial imbalance is usu-
ally foreseeable when neighborhood attendance zones are drawn in segregated resi-
dential areas. In fact, any act that does not reduce known segregation foreseeably
perpetuates it. See Recent Developments, supra note 8, at 744 n.59. For further anal-
ysis of the appropriateness of the foreseeability test see Note, supra note 22, at 523
n.21. See also Gates, The Supreme Court and The Debate Over Discriminatory Purpose
and Disproportionate Impact, 26 Loy. L. REv. 567, 621 (1980) (ambiguities remain
regarding proper approach for establishing discriminatory intent; disproportionate
impact given weighty consideration only in school cases).
Maintaining the fault principle in constitutional adjudication allows judges to dis-




lington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. ,32 the
Supreme Court presented a series of factors for courts to consider in
determining equal protection racial intent.3 3 Among the circum-
stances that courts may examine to infer discriminatory intent are:
racial impact, the sequence of events leading to decisions, departures
from normal procedures, and legislative or administrative history. 34
These factors leave a great deal to the discretion of the judge.35
Courts also have not established definite guidelines for determin-
ing whether school defendants intentionally segregated a "meaning-
ful portion" of the school system.36 Such a quantification is
important to determine the extent of liability and remedy. Discrimi-
nation shown in less than a meaningful portion of the system subjects
Courts then can assert that they are not attempting to redress the inequalities of our
society, a legislative responsibility. Rather, they are only redressing the inequities
produced by racially biased acts. Horwitz, The Jurisprudence of Brown andthe Dilem-
mas of Liberalism, 14 HARV. Civ. R. Civ. L. Rnv. 599, 611 (1979).
32. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
33. Id at 267-68. The Court required a sensitive inquiry into whatever circum-
stantial and direct evidence of intent is available. Disproportionate impact of official
action provides the starting point. It will be determinative only in the rare case of a
clear pattern unexplainable on grounds other than race. Thus, a court must look to
other evidence. 1d at 266.
Courts have applied the Arlington Heights factors in several school cases. For ex-
ample, in United States v. Board of School Comm'rs (Indianapolis), 637 F.2d 1101,
1108 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 838 (1980), the Indiana state legislature
passed legislation extending the civil boundaries of Indianapolis to encompass several
suburbs. Shortly before it had repealed its former legislation that provided that
school district boundaries would expand along with city boundaries. Thus, the signif-
icantly black city system could not consolidate with the suburbs. Considering the
timing of the decision, the history of state sanctioned discrimination, the foreseeable
impact of the decision on the black population, and the political reason for the deci-
sion, the district judge concluded the legislature redrew the boundaries for a discrimi-
natory purpose. Id
34. 429 U.S. at 267-68.
35. See Reed v. Rhodes (Cleveland), 455 F. Supp. 546, 553-54 (N.D. Ohio 1978),
qff'din part, remanded inpart, 607 F.2d 714 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 935
(1980) (clear pattern of actions unexplainable on grounds other than race under Ar-
lingion Heights).
36. See, e.g., Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman (Dayton II), 443 U.S. at 535
(board was purposely operating segregated schools in a substantial part of district
where 54% of black students were assigned to four schools that were 100% black in
early 1950's); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. at 458 (board maintenance
of an enclave of separate black schools constituted substantial portion); Keyes v.
School Dist. No. 1 (Denver), 413 U.S. at 199 (school board deliberately segregated
eight schools attended by 38% of Denver's black students).
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school officials to liability solely for the "incremental effects" of their
intentional acts.37 Intentional segregation shown in a meaningful
portion raises the presumption that school officials intended the seg-
regative effects throughout the entire system.38 The presumption is
almost impossible to disprove.39 School officials must disprove their
intent to segregate the remainder of the school system. Failing that,
they must prove that segregation in the rest of the system did not in
any way result from their intentional acts.4 0 Thus courts have cre-
ated vague tests both to establish racial intent and to quantify the
37. In Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman (Dayton I), 433 U.S. 406 (1977), the
Supreme Court stated that when a court finds a violation it must determine how much
incremental segregative effect these violations had on the racial distribution of present
school population compared to what it would have been without the violations. The
remedy should redress that difference. A court should only fashion a systemwide
remedy if the violation had a systemwide impact. Id at 420. Later, in Dayton II, 443
U.S. at 531, 535-36, the Court made clear that the incremental effects test applied only
to isolated violations, too few to trigger the Keyes presumption of systemwide segre-
gation. See note 38 and accompanying text infra.
38. The Supreme Court established the presumption in Keyes v. School Dist. No.
1 (Denver), 413 U.S. at 211. The court cited several evidentiary principles to support
its burden-shifting presumption as both fair and reasonable. It viewed a finding of
intentional segregation in one part of the school system as highly relevant to the issue
of the board's intent regarding other segregated schools. Id at 207. The presumption
has both space and time dimensions. Intentional segregation in a substantial portion
of the district allows a presumption of intentional segregation in other segregated
schools. Courts presume that intentionally discriminatory acts in the past cause cur-
rent segregation. Defendants may rebut the presumption by showing that (1) segre-
gative intent was not one of the reasons for their action, or failing that, (2) their past
segregative acts did not create or contribute to the current segregated condition of the
other segregated schools. Id at 211.
Since these presumptions are difficult to rebut, plaintifi's burden of proof is less-
ened. The defendants' better access to evidence regarding these decisions helps justify
the burden-shift. So, too, does the probability that defendants committed other viola-
tions, or that their proven acts have either lingering or spillover effects. Note, stqpra
note 22, at 525-26.
39. Justice Rehnquist has suggested that the Keyes presumption is irrebuttable.
He noted that a school board in rebuttal will almost invariably rely on its neighbor-
hood school policy and on residential segregation to show that it is not responsible for
the existence of segregated schools elsewhere in a system. Yet that in itself may sup-
port an inference of a constitutional violation. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443
U.S. at 522. See also Arthur v. Nyquist (Buffalo), 415 F. Supp. 904, 913, 969
(W.D.N.Y. 1976) (defendants' burden in rebutting Keyes presumption is considera-
ble; residential segregation defense as well as neutral neighborhood school defense
rejected as "essentially a smokescreen"); note 254 and accompanying text infra.




extent of segregation required to subject school boards to liability for
systemwide segregation.
2. State Liability for Systemwide Segregation
Once a school plaintiff has proven systemwide liability, the costs of
desegregating may prove too onerous for local districts to bear with-
out taking needed funds from education expenses.4 It is therefore in
plaintiff's best interests to involve the state in the litigation by proving
the state directly liable or indirectly responsible.4"
In a non-statutory state, unlike a statutory state,4 3 plaintiffs must
prove state liability. The primary issue is whether the state continued
to provide funding and support to liable local districts.' Although
local school boards exert a great degree of control over their own
41. For example, the Detroit School Board expressed the concern that financing
desegregation measures could destroy the existing educational program. Since its op-
erating budget was already inadequate, redistribution of resources would further de-
teriorate ongoing programs. Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken II), 433 U.S. 267, 297 n.3
(1977) (Marshall, J., concurring). The Supreme Court ruled that the school desegre-
gation order requiring the state of Michigan to pay one-half the additional cost for
remedial and compensatory programs did not violate the tenth or eleventh amend-
ments. Id at 290-9 1. See also Liddell v. Board of Educ. (St. Louis), 491 F. Supp. 351,
357, (E.D. Mo. 1980) (in light of financial position of St. Louis school district, it is
appropriate that liable defendant State of Missouri pay one-half of desegregation cost
of $22 million), a17'd, No. 80-1458, slip op. (8th Cir. Feb. 13, 1981), cert. denied, 50
U.S.L.W. 3447 (U.S. Dec. 1, 1981).
42. See notes 44-49 and accompanying text infra.
43. See, e.g., Liddell v. Board of Educ. (St. Louis), 491 F. Supp. at 369-70, in
which the court found the State of Missouri liable with the St. Louis Board of Educa-
tion for the segregation of city schools. It asserted that state officials had to take
necessary steps to eliminate all vestiges of former state-imposed public school segre-
gation. Furthermore, the state cannot compartmentalize responsibilty among its vari-
ous instrumentalities. It cannot claim that no single instrumentality is wholly
responsible for or has power to correct unlawful segregation. Id
44. In Penick v. Columbus Bd. of Educ., 583 F.2d 787, 818 (6th Cir. 1978), 519 F.
Supp. 925 (S.D. Ohio), aJ'd, 663 F.2d 24 (6th Cir. 1981), affd sub nom. Ohio State
Bd. of Educ. v. Reed, 50 U.S.L.W. 3765 (U.S. March 23, 1982), the Sixth Circuit
outlined a factual inquiry for ascertaining state liability for local school district segre-
gation. Utilizing this approach, the district court held the State of Ohio liable for
segregation in the Columbus school system. 519 F. Supp. at 925. In affirming this
decision, the Sixth Circuit noted the state board of education had direct knowledge of
the local board's intentional segregative practices. It had never discharged its legal
responsibility to determine whether the local district had not conformed with state
law. Furthermore, the state board continued to finance the locally-segregated schools
and staffs. The motivation and effect of the state board's actions and inactions were
to perpetuate racial segregation. 663 F.2d at 30.
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programs, the state usually provides funding, controls system bound-
aries, and sets minimum educational standards.45 Plaintiffs must
prove the state provided support with the knowledge of the local
board's segregative policies and the intent to further them.46 As in
local school board liability, state intent is difficult to prove because
state officials do not openly express segregative purposes and officials
have many non-segregative reasons for their decisions.47 Alterna-
tively, courts have held the state indirectly responsible and subject to
participate in the remedy. One court held the state liable for the ac-
tions of its agent school boards on a theory of vicarious liability.48
Another court required the state to participate in the remedy despite
its freedom from liability because of its general responsibility for the
welfare of state school children.49
Plaintiffs may therefore gain state participation in the single dis-
trict remedy by proving the state failed to dismantle a statutory dual
system or intentionally contributed to local segregation. Alterna-
tively, plaintiffs may prove a state defendant indirectly responsible
due to its vicarious liability or its responsibility for those harmed by
local violations.
B. State or Local Liability for Interdistrict Segregation Under
Milliken v. Bradley50
Single district school desegregation cases have several advantages
45. In Ohio, for example, the primary responsibility for distributing state and fed-
eral funds rested with the state board of education. 663 F.2d at 29.
46. See, e.g., 583 F.2d at 818.
47. See, e.g., United States v. Board of School Comm'rs (Indianapolis), 637 F.2d
at 1108 (proper under Arlington Heights to infer racial intent from'timing of legisla-
tive decision that abandoned past policy allowing school district boundaries to ex-
pand with city boundaries.); Penick v. Columbus Bd. of Educ. 519 F. Supp. at 928
(court applied Arlington Heights evidentiary factors to find state liable for intentional
support of Columbus school segregation). See note 28 and accompanying text supra.
48. See Hart v. Community School Bd. (Brooklyn), 383 F. Supp. 699, 748
(E.D.N.Y. 1974) (if a school board is found liable for racial segregation, then the state
as its principal is also necessarily liable), aft'd, 512 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975). But see
Milliken v. Bradley (Detroit), 418 U.S. at 746 (Court accepted agency approach only
arguendo; rejected lower court's order that state could use other instrumentalities to
cure violation shown in only one district).
49. Morgan v. Henigan (Boston), 379 F. Supp. at 477 (although state defendants
had not contributed to racial segregation in Boston schools, their continued presence
was necessary to effectuate remedy due to their ultimate responsibility for education
of Boston public school pupils).




over interdistrict cases. Plaintiffs need only prove intentional viola-
tions within the boundaries of one school district. Also, the courts
may be more receptive to a remedy that does not force the court into
a more intrusive, quasi-legislative role of disrupting school district
lines. 51
Nevertheless, due to the magnitude of segregated patterns in many
metropolitan areas, litigants or courts may determine that only in-
terdistrict remedies can feasibly remove the vestiges of dual sys-
tems. 2 The district court in Milliken took that position and ordered
an interdistrict remedy that consolidated the predominately black
Detroit district and its surrounding white suburbs.53 In denying this
interdistrict remedy, the Supreme Court in Milliken set forth general
principles for determining when courts may allow an interdistrict
remedy:
51. In Milliken, for example, the Supreme Court discussed the possible ramifica-
tions of consolidating 54 independent school districts into a vast new super district.
The complex questions arising from such a remedy would cause the district court to
become a defacto legislative authority and perhaps the "school superintendent" for
the entire area. Few judges would be qualified for such a role. Furthermore, exten-
sive judicial intrusion would deprive residents of local control of their schools. Id at
743-44.
For a discussion of judicial intrusion into other branches of government to secure
constitutional rights see Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89
HARv. L. REV. 1281, 1315 (1976) (democratic theory doesn't require deference to
majoritanan outcomes whose victims are ghetto dwellers); Johnson, The Role of the
Federal Courts in Institutional Litigation, 32 ALA. L. REV. 271 (1981) (when officials
succumb to political pressures and shirk constitutional responsibilities, judges must
take an active role; responsible leadership would make such activism unnecessary);
Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L.
REV. 661, 664, 616, (1978) (judicial intrusion into local government sacrifices funda-
mental democratic values to vindicate particular rights; courts have been effective,
however, in achieving policy objectives for politically powerless groups).
52. See, e.g., Adams v. United States (St. Louis), 620 F.2d 1277 at 1296 (appellate
court stated that city-only remedy would leave many schools all black; therefore, co-
operative interdistrict transfers should be sought); Bradley v. Milliken (Detroit), 484
F.2d 215, 249 (6th Cir. 1973) (court believed that multi-district remedy essential since
Detroit-only plan could not correct constitutional violations), rev'd and remanded, 418
U.S. 717 (1974); United States v. Board of School Comm'rs (Indianapolis), 541 F.2d
1211, 1212 (7th Cir. 1976) (plaintiffs sought interdistrict remedy at suggestion of
judge), vacated and remanded mem. sub nom. Board of School Comm'rs v. Buckley,
429 U.S. 1068 (1977) (to determine intent in light of Washington v. Davis).
53. Bradley v. Milliken (Detroit), 345 F. Supp. 914, 916, 922, (E.D. Mich. 1972)
(plaintiffs and defendants, as well as court, favored metropolitan remedy), aFd In
part, vacated and remanded in part, 484 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd and remanded,
418 U.S. 717 (1974).
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(I)t must first be shown that there has been a constitutional vio-
lation within one district that produces a significant segregative
effect in another district. Specifically, it must be shown that ra-
cially discriminatory acts of the state or local school districts, or
of a single school district have been a substantial cause of in-
terdistrict segregation. 4
This formulation appears to permit plaintiffs to show that intentional
state acts caused significant multidistrict effects, or that one or more
local school boards intentionally discriminated within their districts
causing extradistrict effects."
The Milliken principle raises two critical questions. First, how can
local school districts or the state cause interdistrict effects? Second,
how should a court measure the significance of effects? The next two
parts will analyze how these issues affect the determination of in-
terdistrict liability of local and state school officials.
1. Single District School Segregation with Extra District Effects
In Milliken the court emphasized that each local school district is a
relatively autonomous body. 6 Absent a finding of an intentional vi-
54. 418 U.S. at 745. The court gave two examples of circumstances justifying
interdistrict remedy: (1) discriminatory acts of one or more districts that cause racial
segregation in an adjacent district, and (2) discriminatory district line drawing.
"(W)ithout an interdistrict violation and interdistrict effect, there can be no interdis-
trict remedy." Id
The latter phrase has caused confusion. In a later housing case, Justice Stewart
explained that an interdistrict remedy required an interdistrict violation or effect. He
explained that an interdistrict remedy would have been proper in Milliken if viola-
tions by school officials in the operation of the Detroit system had caused any signifi-
cant effects in the suburbs. Hills v. Gautreaux (Chicago), 425 U.S. 284, 294-296 &
n.12 (1976).
The Fifth Circuit recently gave the principle another reading. It read Milliken to
require that defendants intend to cause the interdistrict segregative effects. The court
observed that should effect alone transform an otherwise intradistrict action into an
interdistrict violation, the phrase "interdistrict violation" is redundant. Taylor v.
Ouachita Parish School Bd., 648 F.2d 959, 969 (5th Cir. 1981). This interpretation,
however, seems contradictory to another Fifth Circuit opinion wherein the court held
that even inadvertent effects of a constitutional violation must be remedied. United
States v. Texas Educ. Agency (Lubbock), 600 F.2d 518, 527 (5th Cir. 1979).
55. For discussions of possible interpretations of these principles see Kanner, In-
terdistrict Remediesfor School Segregation After Milliken v. Bradley and Hills v.
Gautreaux, 48 Miss. L. J. 33 (1977) and Note, supra note 22, at 521.
56. 418 U.S. at 741. The Court emphasized the deeply rooted national tradition
of local control of the schools as well as the large degree of local autonomy provided




olation or segregative effects within a school district, courts may not
impinge upon local district autonomy. 7 Given the Milliken empha-
sis on local control, it may be difficult to perceive how even the inten-
tional acts of one school district can cause segregation in another
district outside its control." The busing of minority students across
district lines furnishes the clearest example. 9 It denies minority stu-
dents the opportunity to attend integrated schools, and it reinforces
the identification of certain districts as "white" or "black".60 Refusal
of a primarily white school district to consolidate with a primarily
black school district provides another example of single district acts
that reinforce and perpetuate racial disparity across district lines.6 1
When one or more school districts cause extra-district segregation,
Milliken requires that the effects be "significant" to justify an in-
terdistrict remedy.62 Yet courts have left "significant," like "mean-
57. 418 U.S. at 744-45.
58. See Taylor, The Supreme Court and Urban Reality: A Tactical Analysis of
Milliken v. Bradley, 21 WAYNE L. REv. 751, 758 (1975) (difficult to demonstrate that
the dejure actions of city school board had segregative impact on suburban schools;
segregated city schools probably induce white families to remain in city); United
States v. Board of School Comm'rs (Indianapolis), 506 F. Supp. 657, 667 (S.D. Ind.
1979) (city school segregation more likely to keep whites from leaving than the re-
verse; in contrast, desegregation tends to cause white flight from districts involved),
.ff'd in part, rey'd in part, 637 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 838
(1980).
59. The interdistrict effect of such a transfer is that the sending district remains
white and the receiving schools become blacker. See Newburg Area Council, Inc. v.
Board of Educ. (Louisville), 510 F.2d 1358 1360 (6th Cir. 1974) (sending children
across district lines continued to have an effect on racial imbalance in county's
schools), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 931 (1975).
60. See, e.g., Evans v. Buchanan (Wilmington), 393 F. Supp. 428, 433 (D. Del.
1975) (city schools to which black suburban children had been sent remained identifi-
ably black though transfers had ceased), a f'dmem., 423 U.S. 963 (1975).
61. See, e.g., United States v. Missouri, 515 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir. 1975). The case
involved three suburban St. Louis County school districts. Prior to 1954, school offi-
cials split one statutorily segregated district into an all-black district and an all-white
district. The district judge held that state, county, and local defendants had main-
tained the black district for discriminatory reasons. Numerous reorganization plans
excluded the black district. The electorate defeated the only reorganization plan that
included it. This inaction, for discriminatory reasons, in the face of past segregation,
justified consolidating the black district with two adjoining white districts. Id at
1369-70. The district judge viewed the circumstances as fitting the Milliken formula-
tion of discriminatory acts of one or more districts causing segregation in an adjacent
district. Id
62. 418 U.S. at 745.
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ingful portion",6" undefined. Two courts have found cross district
busing of a few children to be de minimis, without indicating what
number would be significant.64 On the other hand, two courts cited
transfers across district lines as a partial justification for an interdis-
trict remedy. In a case where refusals to consolidate affected an
entire school district, a court has found the significance to be more
obvious.6 6 Thus, even if plaintiffs meet the burden of establishing
cause and intent, proving that the effects are significant poses a sub-
stantial obstacle.
2. State Segregative Acts with Multidistrict Effects
Almost every interdistrict school case includes a claim against the
state for exercising its controls over several school districts to effect
multidistrict segregation.67 State legislatures and executive agencies
can cause multidistrict segregation through their power to draw
school district lines, regulate consolidation, and fund school district
activities like busing. 6s Segregative line drawing has been the most
63. See notes 36-40 and accompanying text supra.
64. Milliken v. Bradley (Detroit), 418 U.S. at 750 (transfer of black high school
students from black suburban district to black city high schools may have had in-
terdistrict effect; this isolated instance, however, did not justify interdistrict consolida-
tion); Tasby v. Estes (Dallas), 572 F.2d 1010, 1015-16 (5th Cir. 1978) (effect of transfer
of eleven black students from suburban school district to inner-city school was negli-
gible; therefore, denial of interdistrict remedy was correct), cert. dismissed sub nor,
Estes v. Metropolitan Branches of Dallas N.A.A.C.P., 444 U.S. 437 (1980).
65. See Evans v. Buchanan (Wilmington), 393 F. Supp. at 430 (interdistrict trans-
portation of students attending all-black or all-white schools prior to 1954 cited as one
of eight violations justifying interdistrict remedy); Newburg Area Council, Inc. v.
Board of Educ. (Louisville), 510 F.2d at 1360-61 (interdistrict transfer involving two
largest of three county districts justified, in part, interdistrict remedy; not mere iso-
lated instance as in Milieen).
66. See United States v. Missouri, 515 F.2d at 1370 (each defendant, including
predominantly white suburban district, responsible to substantial degree for main-
taining all-black segregated district).
67. See, e.g., United States v. Board of School Comm'rs (Indianapolis) 637 F.2d
at 1104 (state legislature prevented expansion of school district boundaries); Liddell v.
Board of Educ. (St. Louis), 469 F. Supp. 1304 (E.D. Mo. 1979), Motion of St. Louis
School Board for Leave to Amend Its Answer to Add a Cross-claim (Jan. 9, 1981)
(alleged state refusal to consolidate school districts); Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F. Supp.
at 430 (state legislature excluded Wilmington School District from general consolida-
tion of districts).
68. See, e.g., Morrilton School Dist. No. 32 v. United States, 606 F.2d 222 (8th
Cir. 1979) (consolidation of school districts on basis of race done under neutral state




common form of liability.69 Several recent cases, however, have
found states liable for preventing heavily minority school districts
from consolidating with surrounding, primarily white school dis-
tricts.7" One case held that state funding of cross district busing of
minority or white students had segregative effects.71 Particularly in
cross-district transfer cases, however, courts must address the issue of
whether the effects were significant.7" Thus, each court's assessment
of significance of effects varies with the actor and the type of action
examined. A state's discriminatory line-drawing or prevention of
consolidation produces obviously significant effects where racial im-
balance between districts results. On the other hand, courts more
carefully scrutinize significance when local or state actions in one dis-
trict give rise to effects in another.
In brief, to establish pure school liability in non-statutory states,
plaintiffs may have to satisfy vague, undefined tests for intent, mean-
ingful portion and significant effects. Only when plaintiffs meet these
heavy evidentiary burdens will courts remedy the constitutional
violations.
C. Pure School Remedies
Once courts find a defendant liable for school segregation, they
must fashion appropriate remedies. Several amorphous general prin-
ciples govern their broad equitable remedial powers. The nature and
scope of the constitutional violation determines the nature of the
ton), 393 F. Supp. at 436, 447 (state subsidized interdistrict transportation of public,
private, and parochial students; also passed legislative act governing school district
consolidation).
69. See, e.g., Morrilton School Dist. v. United States, 606 F.2d 222, 228 (8th Cir.
1979) (state consolidated smaller school districts on basis of race); United States v.
Missouri, 515 F.2d at 1369 (state created black school district by splitting it off from
larger, pre-existing district); Haney v. County Bd. of Educ. (Sevier County), 410 F.2d
920, 924 (8th Cir. 1969) (state allowed gerrymandered districts which produced one
white and one black district); Hoots v. Commonwealth of Pa., 510 F. Supp. 615, 620
(W.D. Pa. 1981) (state and county boards liable for discriminatory line-drawing; sur-
rounding districts may be included in remedy, though allegedly uninvolved).
70. See note 67 supra.
71. See, e.g., Evans v. Buchanan (Wilmington), 393 F. Supp. at 436-37 (state
transportation subsidy for private school pupils travelling across district lines aug-
mented racial disparity between Wilmington and suburbs).
72. See note 64 supra.
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remedy.73 It must be related to the condition that offends the Consti-
tution.74 The district judge or school authorities must make every
effort to achieve the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation
taking into account the practicalities of the situation.75 Courts must
consider whom they should require to participate in the remedy and
the extent of remedy justified by the violation. Based on these princi-
ples, the broad affirmative school remedies courts typically award in
both single and interdistrict cases are highly intrusive upon the poli-
cies and practices of school board defendants.
For single-district violations the court-approved desegregation
techniques include: busing, redrawing of attendance zones and pair-
ing of schools,76 magnet schools,77 retraining78 and reassignment of
teachers,79 remedial programs and curriculum changes," ° and efforts
to effect voluntary interdistrict exchanges. 8' In addition, some courts
have ordered state governments to pay part of the desegregation
cost.
8 2
Multidistrict remedies may not include governmental units that
were neither involved in nor affected by a constitutional violation .
3
Courts can, however, order non-liable school districts to participate
in multidistrict remedies when they find that the constitutional viola-
tions of others affect them.84 For example, where courts have found
73. Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken II), 433 U.S. 267, 280 (1977); Swann v. Char-
lotte-Mecklenburg, 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971).
74. 433 U.S. at 280.
75. Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs (Mobile County), 402 U.S. 33, 37 (1971).
76. See, e.g., Swam v. Charlotte Mecklenburg, 402 U.S. at 27-30.
77. Liddell v. Board of Educ. (St. Louis), 491 F. Supp. at 354.
78. Milliken v. Bradley (Detroit), 402 F. Supp. 1096, 1139 (E.D. Mich.), 411 F.Supp. 943 (E.D. Mich. 1975), modfed and remanded, 540 F.2d 229 (6th Cir. 1976),
aI'd, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) (Milliken II).
79. 491 F. Supp. at 357. Milliken v. Bradley (Detroit), 402 F. Supp. at 1144.
80. 402 F. Supp. at 1138, 1144.
81. 491 F. Supp. at 353.
82. Id (State of Missouri to pay one-half of desegregation cost of $22 million);
Miiken 11, 433 U.S. at 293 (state to pay one-half of certain desegregation programs).
83. Hills v. Gautreaux (Chicago), 425 U.S. at 292-96; Metropolitan Hous. Dev.
Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 469 F. Supp. 836, 855 (N.D. 111. 1979), afJ'd,
616 F.2d 1006 (7th Cir. 1980).
84. See United States v. Board of School Comm'rs (Indianapolis), 637 F.2d at
1115 (power of court to order interdistrict remedy does not depend on culpability or
innocence of suburban districts where discriminatory actions by state had significant




states liable for discriminatory line-drawing or the prevention of con-
solidation of black and white districts, they have imposed remedies
on non-liable school districts."5 Multidistrict school remedies may
include all the measures available in single district school cases. 6
Those ordered to date have ranged from the highly intrusive forced
consolidation of school districts' to the less intrusive one-way busing
of black children to white suburbs.88
D. Summary of the Pure School Model
In general, vague tests for establishing constitutional violations
pose difficult obstacles for school plaintiffs seeking to establish the
liability of school actors. Initially, plaintiffs must demonstrate a
causal connection between official actions and resulting segregation.
In both single and interdistrict cases in non-statutory states, plaintiffs
then face the complex problem of proving that defendants acted with
discriminatory intent. Moreover, concepts of "meaningful portion"
in single district cases and "significant effects" lack definite quantita-
tive measures to guide either the litigants or the courts. Yet plaintiffs
must successfully achieve these threshholds to obtain remedy.
(where state and county boards are liable for segregative district line drawing, court
may include surrounding districts in interdistrict remedy, despite alleged lack of in-
volvement); School Dist. of Kansas City v. State of Mo., 460 F. Supp. 421, 429-30
(W.D. Mo. 1978), appeal dismissed, 592 F.2d 493 (8th Cir. 1979) (rejected idea that
metropolitan remedy can only encompass guilty suburbs); Note, Interdistrict Remedies
for Segregated Schools, 79 COL. L. REV. 1168, 1183 (1979).
85. See United States v. Board of School Comm'rs (Indianapolis) 637 F.2d at
1115 (interdistrict remedy ordered although no evidence that suburban districts in-
volved were unitary systems; state liable for preventing expansion of significantly
black city district); Morrilton School Dist. No. 32 v. United States, 606 F.2d at 228-29,
(state consolidated small districts on basis of race; therefore, interdistrict remedy
could include school districts that are state's instrumentalities and which were product
of violation); Hoots v. Commonwealth of Pa., 510 F. Supp. at 620 (where state's dis-
criminatory line-drawing created segregated district, court may include surrounding
districts in consolidation remedy, despite their alleged lack of involvement in the dis-
cnmination process); Evans v. Buchanan (Wilmington), 393 F. Supp. at 437-38 (state
government acts causing interdistrict effects justified interdistrict remedy even though
suburban districts were operating unitary schools).
86. See notes 76-82 and accompanying text supra.
87. See, e.g., Morrilton School Dist. No. 32 v. United States, 606 F.2d at 230
(consolidation of three school districts); Evans v. Buchanan (Wilmington), 416 F.
Supp. at 350 (some type of consolidation of city and suburban districts required).
88. See United States v. Board of School Comm'rs (Indianapolis), 637 F.2d at
1114-15 (although two-way busing would have been permissible, remedy that only
transferred city black students to suburban districts not an abuse of discretion).
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Nevertheless, once plaintiffs satisfy these difficult evidentiary bur-
dens, courts typically award broad affirmative decrees that impinge
upon local autonomy. Multidistrict plans that consolidate city and
suburban districts are even more intrusive. A yet more salient conse-
quence of interdistrict remedies is that courts may include even non-
liable local districts if plaintiffs show that significant effects of an-
other's liable acts extend within their boundaries. Thus, although
plaintiffs in school cases must meet stringent liability standards, they
may win broad, far-reaching remedies. In contrast, as the next sub-
section will discuss, housing plaintiffs bear a lesser burden in proving
liability. Yet they generally achieve much narrower relief.
II. PURE HOUSING MODEL
Despite the apparent connection between residential segregation
and segregated schools, 9 housing cases are traditionally separate
from school cases. Consequently, housing law has developed along
different lines, reflecting different standards and concerns.9" Plain-
tiffs who satisfy the tough liability standards in school cases receive
extensive remedies that heavily impinge upon local autonomy. Al-
though housing plaintiffs may prove liability more easily, they gener-
ally cannot obtain broad equitable relief. Most housing plaintiffs sue
under federal statutes that provide more flexibility than equal protec-
tion standards.9 Due to judicial deference to federal, state, and local
housing entities92 and the fragmented nature of the residential hous-
ing market,93 however, housing plaintiffs seldom receive systemwide
relief from governmental discrimination. Instead, they usually re-
ceive only site-specific relief.94
Two recent developments in housing law may indicate an early
trend toward more systemwide remedies. 95 Discriminatory site selec-
tion cases, led by a recent Supreme Court decision,96 suggest that
courts may build upon the unique capability of some housing entities
89. See note 2 supra.
90. See notes 102-16 and accompanying text infra.
91. See notes 102-09 and accompanying text infra.
92. See notes 110-16 and accompanying text infra.
93. See note 112 and accompanying text infra.
94. See note 116 and accompanying text infra.
95. See notes 119-54 and accompanying text infra.





to provide metropolitan-wide remedies that do not impinge on local
autonomy. Furthermore, as in school cases, a court may order intru-
sive housing remedies that reach as far as the proven segregative ef-
fects.97 For example, several exclusionary zoning cases provide tests
for proving patterns and practices of discrimination by governmental
housing entities.98 By proving a more pervasive liability, plaintiffs
may obtain more comprehensive relief. At this time, it is too early to
ascertain what impact the developments will have on housing case
law.
In recent school cases, plaintiffs have joined government housing
officials, alleging that residential segregation reinforced and even
caused school segregation.99 By charging that housing segregation
reinforced school segregation, plaintiffs avoid the difficult problems
of merging the different standards of school and housing cases. 10 At
97. See notes 123-35 and accompanying text infra.
98. See notes 139-43, 147-52 and accompanying text infra.
99. See, e.g., United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 518 F. Supp. 191, 193, 196
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (plaintiffs alleged that community development agency's discrimina-
tory public housing site selection perpetuated and aggravated housing and school seg-
regation); Bell v. Board of Educ. (Akron), 491 F. Supp. 916, 945-48 (N.D. Ohio 1980)
(plaintiffs failed to prove race was a factor in actions of Ohio Real Estate Commis-
sion, City of Akron, and housing authority that caused segregative impact in schools);
Liddell v. Board of Educ. (St. Louis), 469 F. Supp. 1304 (E.D. Mo. 1979), Order (Aug.
24, 1981) (plaintiff intervenors and defendant school board crossclaimed against
housing agencies and municipalities; district court stayed motion against most of
housing parties), remandedfrr want ofurisdiction, No. 81-1828, slip op. at 43 (8th Cir.
Feb. 25, 1982); United States v. Board of School Comm'rs (Indianapolis), 419 F.
Supp. 180, 182 (S.D. Ind. 1975) (defendant school board alleged in crossclaim that
discriminatory public housing policies contributed to segregated schools), a f'd, 541
F.2d 1211 (7th Cir. 1976), xacated and remanded mem. sub nont Board of School
Comm'rs v. Buckley, 429 U.S. 1068 (1977), 573 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1978), 456 F. Supp.
183 (S.D. Ind. 1978), a#'d in part, rey'd in part, 637 F.2d 1101, 1117 (7th Cir. 1980)
(court enjoined public housing authority from constructing any public housing in ra-
cially impacted Indianapolis), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 838 (1980); Evans v. Buchanan
(Wilmington), 393 F. Supp. 428, 430 (D. Del.) ( plaintiff alleged inter alia that state
enforcement and authorization of private racial discrimination in housing caused in-
terdistrict school segregation), afdmena, 423 U.S. 963 (1975) (dissenting opinion did
not address housing grounds for school remedy); Hart v. Community School Bd.
(Brooklyn), 383 F. Supp. 699, 706 (E.D.N.Y.) (school board defendants impleaded
city, state and federal housing officials, charging that housing acts caused school seg-
regation), mod/fed, 383 F. Supp. 769, 775 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (rigid decree against hous-
ing entities would be poorly designed to restructure an entire community; only
progress reports required), aj'd, 512 F.2d 37, 56 (2d Cir. 1975) (case against third
party housing defendants moot and should be dismissed).
100. See notes 158-59, 167-99 and accompanying text infra.
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the same time, they can increase the range of remedies that contribute
to school desegregation."0 '
The following subsections will analyze limitations derived from
traditional housing cases, describe new housing developments, and
illustrate the new developments in discriminatory site-selection and
exclusionary zoning cases. The final subsection will then discuss the
application of the housing model in school desegregation cases.
A. Limitations Within Traditional Housing Cases
Housing law has evolved more lenient liability standards but nar-
rower remedies than those found in school cases. Whereas plaintiffs
must generally bring school cases under rigorous equal protection
standards,10 2 victims of alleged housing discrimination may bring
- suit under equal protection 3 or federal statutes."° Unlike equal
101. See notes 160-61 and accompanying text infra.
102. See notes 28-35 and accompanying text supra.
103. U.S. CONsT. amend XIV. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro-
politan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1972) (plaintiffs alleged violations under
equal protection and Fair Housing Act); Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo (Philadel-
phia), 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977) (plaintiffs alleged violations under equal protection
and Fair Housing Act), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978); Dailey v. City of Lawton,
425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970) (plaintiffs alleged violations under equal protection
and § 1983).
104. Plaintiffs may bring actions under executive order or statutes.
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1976) prohibits dis-
crimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin against persons eligible to
participate in and receive benefits of any federally assisted program. Title VI exempts
FHA mortgate insurance, VA loan guarantees, Farmers Home housing, and conven-
tionally financed housing outside of urban renewal areas.
The Fair Housing Act of 1968 (Title VIII), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19 (1976) prohibits
discrimination in the sale or rental of all housing, except single family housing not
sold through a broker and not advertised preferentially, and owner-occupied four-
family housing. See, e.g., Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo (Philadelphia), 564 F.2d at
153 (city and housing agencies violated Fair Housing Act); United States v. City of
Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1188 (8th Cir. 1974) (city's exclusionary zoning violated
Fair Housing Act), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975).
42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976) of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, as revitalized in Jones v.
Alfred Mayer Co. (St. Louis County), 392 U.S. 409 (1968), prohibits discrimination in
sale or rental of all housing, without exception. Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc.
(Chicago), 501 F.2d 324, 334-39 (7th Cir.) (plaintiffs establishedprimaface case that
realtors exploited black demands for housing in pattern and practice of discrimina-
tion, violating 42 U.S.C. § 1982), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1070 (1974).
Executive Order 12, 259, 46 Fed. Reg. 1253 (1980), issued by President Carter after
his defeat, required the Attorney General and HUD to provide coordinated enforce-




protection cases, statutory housing cases merely require plaintiffs to
show some form of discriminatory effect 105 rather than intent. 10
6
Furthermore, while equal protection housing cases have generally
denied standing to plaintiffs unable to prove a specific direct harm, 107
Order No. 11,063, 27 Fed. Reg. 11,527 (1962) bars discrimination in FHA insured or
VA loan guaranteed housing as well as federally assisted public housing.
105. The effects tests vary by jurisdiction and have not been reconciled by the
Supreme Court. See, e.g., Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo (Philadelphia), 564 F.2d at
148-49 (once plaintiff has developedprimafacie case of discriminatory effect, defend-
ant has burden to show that action serves a legitimate, bona fide interest and no less
discriminatory alternative available); Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of
Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290-93 (7th Cir. 1977) (once plaintiff establishes a
racially discriminatory effect, the court will consider the strength of the plaintiffs
showing, evidence of discriminatory intent, defendant's interest in taking the action,
and whether plaintiff seeks affirmative or injunctive relief), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025
(1978); United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1184-85 (once plaintiff has
establishedprimafacie case of discriminatory effect, defendant has burden to demon-
strate a compelling governmental interest). For further discussion of discriminatory
effect and Title VIII, see Schwemm, Discriminatory Effect and the Fair Housing Act,
54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 199 (1978).
106. See notes 28-35 and accompanying text supra.
107. In Warth v. Seldin (Penfield), 422 U.S. 490, 508, 514, 517 (1974), the court
denied standing to individual plaintiffs and organizations alleging exclusionary zon-
ing by the city of Penfield. The court applied constitutional and prudential limita-
tions to arrive at its finding. Under the constitutional limitation, plaintiffs must have
suffered some threatened or actual injury to satisfy the "case or controversy" require-
ments of U.S. CONST. art. III. 422 U.S. at 498-99. The individual plaintiffs were
neither residents of Penfield nor developers denied construction permits. Id at 503.
The court held that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a "substantial probability" that,
absent Penfield's restrictive zoning practices, they would have been able to purchase
or live there. Id at 504. Thus, even though Penfield's zoning allocated 98% of its
vacant land to single family detached housing, and other regulations made multifam-
ily residential development infeasible, plaintiffs were denied standing. Id at 495, 508.
Under prudential limitations, the Court refused to permit claims of "generalized
grievances" or allegations based on the interests of third parties. Id at 499. Conse-
quently, the Court denied standing to the organizations, none of whose members
could demonstrate direct harm. Id at 510, 514, 517.
In vigorous dissent, Justice Brennan presented a portrait of "total, purposeful, in-
transigent exclusion of certain classes of people. . . pursuant to a conscious scheme
never deviated from," id at 523, that presented insurmountable difficulties to poten-
tial developers. He stated that the court rewarded the city's exclusionary practices by
turning its "allegedly unconstitutional scheme into a barrier to a lawsuit seeking its
invalidation." Id
The Court may have loosened its standing requirements in Arlington Heights. The
Court granted standing to a developer denied a zoning change, based on his economic
injury and "right to be free of irrational zoning actions." 429 U.S. at 262-63. Because
the developers planned a specific housing project, the Court also provided standing to
a minority plaintiff who had a "substantial probability" of residing there. Id at 264.
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recent Fair Housing Act cases interpret the act to impose more re-
laxed standing requirements. For example, courts permit nonresi-
dent plaintiff "testers" to allege harm from discriminatory
practices.108 As a result, most successful plaintiffs in housing cases
sue under the statutes rather than the equal protection clause. 10 9
Two factors have caused courts to limit the scope of the resulting
housing remedy: the fragmented nature of housing and broad fed-
Thus the Court bootstrapped an individual plaintiff into the case. The presence of the
black plaintiff also required the Court to increase its level of scrutiny. Id at 266.
See generally Sager, Questions I Wish I Had Never Asked" The Burger Court in
Exclusionary Zoning, 11 Sw. U.L. REv. 509-44 (1979), which paints a discouraging
picture of Supreme Court deference to municipal land use practices at the expense of
minority rights. The author calls the Warth decision an "analytical embarrassment"
and a "practical disaster for the federal litigation of exclusionary zoning classes." Id
at 517. Despite some loosening of standing requirements subsequent to Warth, id at
519, the author notes that the court has generally restricted such cases to site-specific
allegations of direct, rather than indirect harm. Id at 516. See also Mandelker, Ra-
cial Discrimination and Exclusionary Zoning: 4 Perspective On Arlington Heights, 55
TEx. L. REv. 1217-53 (1977), who argues for a more activist judicial role in protecting
housing opportunities for minorities against exclusionary zoning practices tradition-
ally deferred to by the Supreme Court. Id at 1229, 1253.
For state court decisions rejecting the Warth standing rule, see Stocks v. City of
Irvine, 114 Cal. App. 3d 520, 520, 170 Cal. Rptr. 724, 724 (Cal. 1981); Homebuilders
League v. Township of Berlin, 81 N.J. 127, 405 A.2d 381, 383 (1979).
See also note 141 and accompanying text infra.
108. See, e.g., Coles v. Havens Realty Corp. (Richmond), 633 F.2d 384, 387-88
(4th Cir. 1980), aff'd sub nont Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 50 U.S.L.W. 4232
(U.S. Feb. 24, 1982) (testers granted standing to assert injuries on behalf of third
parties under 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601, 3604, and 3612 of the Fair Housing Act); Gladstone
v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 111 (1978) (plaintiff homeowners in community
where violation occurred granting standing as "persons aggrieved" to present a pri-
vate right of action under 42 U.S.C. § 3612 of the Fair Housing Act); Trafficante v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (San Francisco), 409 U.S. 205, 208 (1972) (residents of
apartment complex granted standing as "persons aggrieved" to seek HUD assistance
under 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a) of the Fair Housing Act because they had lost the social
benefits of living in an integrated community, had missed business and professional
advantages, and suffered embarrassment and economic damage). See generally Note,
Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman: Extending Standing in Racial Hearing Cases to
Housing Associations and Testers, 22 URBAN L. ANN. 107 (1981).
109. See, e.g., United States v. Parma, 661 F.2d 562, 565 (6th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3830 (U.S. April 20, 1982); Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v.
Village of Arlington Heights, 616 F.2d 1006, 1008 (7th Cir. 1980) (after Supreme
Court found no equal protection violation, the circuit court found defendants violated
the Fair Housing Act); Park View Heights v. City of Black Jack, 605 F.2d 1033, 1035
(8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 905 (1980); Resident Advisory Board v. Rizzo




eral court deference to municipal control110 and agency discretion."1 '
While government entities, such as public housing agencies or munic-
ipalities, exercise general regulatory controls over zoning and con-
struction standards, they directly control only a small percentage of
housing construction. 1 2 Accordingly, any remedy to violations of a
specific governmental entity will have a minimal impact on racial res-
idential patterns. In addition, federal courts avoid intruding into
housing and land use decisions by agencies and municipalities." 3
For example, courts generally hesitate to permit occupants of public
housing to challenge the policies of HUD and its agents, without a
clear case of racial discrimination." 4 In a series of major cases, the
110. A series of Supreme Court cases demonstrate broad deference to municipal
zoning practices that inhibit or prevent low to moderate income housing. See, e.g.,
Warth v. Seldin (Penfield), 422 U.S. at 504 (courts could not grant standing without
site-specific remedy); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394-95
(1926) (zoning classifications excluding apartment houses justified under general wel-
fare); James v. Valtierra (San Jose), 402 U.S. 137, 142-43 (1971) (sustains referendum
provision requiring voter approval of low income housing projects, absent proof of
racial intent); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974) (permits exclusion-
ary zoning to promote "family values").
See generally Mandelker, supra note 107, at 1217-53 (strict intent test permits chal-
lenges to racially discriminatory practices of municipalities only in the most blatant
cases); Sager, supra note 107, at 509-44 (notes traditional federal court deference to
local government expertise, political accountability, and capacity; the failure of the
courts to develop a test of racial impact on housing to reach exclusionary zoning
practices; and the courts' failure to require regional responsibility from municipal
entities).
I 1. See, e.g., Falzarano v. United States (Boston), 607 F.2d 506, 509-13 (1st Cir.
1979) (denied standing to plaintiff tenants in federally subsidized housing projects
under each of three theories: private right of action under the National Housing Act;
third party beneficiaries of the regulatory agreement between HUD and the land-
lords; and persons harmed by landlords acting under color of state law. Thus court
deferred to HUD's administrative discretion under 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1976)). But
see N.A.A.C.P. v. Harris (Boston), 607 F.2d 514, 518-26 (1st Cir. 1979) (minority
plaintiffs allegedly harmed by HUD's failure to ensure affirmative action require-
ments in C.D.B.G. and U.D.A.G. programs granted standing to seek injunctive and
declaratory relief). See general, HoUsING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 68-69
(D. Mandelker et al. eds. 1981) (courts generally defer to federal agency discretion
except when plaintiffs submit challenges on racial discrimination grounds; even then,
courts defer to agency decisions about programs, limiting challenges to specific
projects).
112. For example, subsidized housing constitutes approximately two percent of
the St. Louis metropolitan housing stock. Interview with St. Louis County Housing
Authonty official, Mar. 2, 1981.
113. See notes 110-11 and accompanying text supra.
114. See note 111 and accompanying text supra.
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Supreme Court acknowledged broad powers of municipalities to
make decisions regarding zoning and building standards. 15 As a re-
suit, when plaintiffs prove housing violations, courts have generally
limited the remedy to site-specific relief rather than general sanctions
against municipalities or other government housing agencies.'"
6
Thus housing case law has primarily developed along statutory,
rather than constitutional standards because of the looser require-
ments for intent and standing. Nevertheless, the fragmented nature
of housing and the traditional judicial deference to municipalities
and government agencies has limited the scope of remedies that
housing plaintiffs can obtain. The following subsection will explore
new developments in housing case law that may signal judicial ac-
ceptance of expanded theories of liability and remedy.
B. New Housing Developments of Systemwide Liability
Although courts in housing cases have generally limited the reme-
dies to site-specific relief, they have required zoning changes, ordered
issuance of building permits, and enjoined municipal interference
with the remedy." 7 More recent cases build on these types of reme-
dies to offer broad scale relief to general classes of plaintiffs."' These
115. See note 110 supra.
116. See, e.g., Park View Heights v. City of Black Jack, 605 F.2d at 1040 (al-
though class of plaintiffs entitled to equitable relief for the exclusionary affects of the
city's zoning ordinance, district court should avoid ordering a remedy more intrusive
than necessary); Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo (Philadelphia), 564 F.2d at 152
(where action against public housing authority delayed construction of one low in-
come housing project, court denied injunctive order requiring a tenant reassignment
plan for all public housing projects in Philadelphia); Garrett v. City of Hamtramck,
503 F.2d 1236, 1248-49 (6th Cir. 1974) (circuit court cut back on district court's rem-
edy that required provision of replacement housing outside of the municipality where
discriminatory urban renewal policies took place). See generally Mandelker, supra
note 107, at 1219 (as of that time all federal cases on racial discrimination in zoning
had been "site-specific"), and Sager, supra note 107, at 518 (exclusionary zoning liti-
gation has been narrowed to a "project-by-project" basis).
117. See, e.g., United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1188 (ordered dis-
trict court to enjoin city from enforcing exclusionary zoning ordinance); Metropolitan
Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 469 F. Supp. 836, 869-73 (N.D. I11.
1979) (approved consent decree in which Arlington Heights agreed to annex, rezone,
and provide services to land for construction of multi-family units), af'd, 616 F.2d
1006, 1015 (7th Cir. 1980); Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo (Philadelphia), 425 F.
Supp. 987, 1029 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (ordered public housing authority to construct a
housing project and enjoined all parties from interference), afTd, 564 F.2d 126, 150
(3d Cir. 1977).




cases involve discriminatory site selection and exclusionary zoning.
1. Discriminatory Site Selection Cases
Government housing agencies often exercise authority over a
broad geographic area that may include several municipalities." 9
Generally, courts have limited remedies against public housing agen-
cies, like municipalities, to site-specific relief. 2 However, a recent
Supreme Court case suggested that plaintiffs can obtain broader
remedies. 121
In Hills v. Gautreaux (Chicago), 122 the Court noted that the rele-
vant geographic area for considering potential housing remedies may
include the entire area of the guilty actor's authority, even if it over-
laps other government entities.' 23 In Gautreaux, the range of author-
ity of the defendants, HUD and the Chicago Housing Authority,
extended beyond the site of their violations in Chicago to includesuburban entities. 2 The Court stated that Milliken did not confine
the remedy to the site of the violation or its effects.' 25 Because HUD
119. See, e.g., Hills v. Gautreaux (Chicago), 425 U.S. 284, 298, & n.14 (1976);
United States v. Board of School Comm'rs (Indianapolis), 637 F.2d 1101, 1109 (7th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 838 (1980); Crow v. Brown (Atlanta), 332 F. Supp.
382, 385 (N.D. Ga. 1971), a§'d, 457 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1972), overruled on other
grounds in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 244 n.12 (1976).
120. See note 116 and accompanying text supra.
121. Hills v. Gautreaux (Chicago), 425 U.S. 284 (1976).
122. Id
123. Id at 298. The Court held that the Department of Housing and Urban De-
velopment (HUD) and the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) wrongfully confined
plaintiffs to segregated public housing in the City of Chicago, depriving plaintiffs of
housing opportunities throughout the metropolitan area. Id at 299. Both HUD and
the CHA had authority to operate beyond Chicago city limits. Id at 298 n.14. The
Court distinguished housing from school remedies by stating that the "relevant geo-
graphic area" for an injured party's housing option is the metropolitan housing mar-
ket rather than the city limits. Id at 299. Milliken did not suggest that federal courts
lack authority to remedy violations outside the place of the harm, as long as the courts
do not interfere with government entities not implicated in the violation. Id at 298,
300-01. Thus HUD and the CHA could provide remedies in Chicago suburbs if they
could do so without infringing on non-liable suburban government entities. Id at
298-99.
124. Id at 298 & n.14.
125. Id at 298. The Court notes that "Milli/ken required either a showing of an
interdistrict violation or a segregative effect" before the court could interfere with
local district autonomy. Id at 296 n.12. Consequently, when the Court discusses
government entities "not implicated in unconstitutional conduct," id at 298, it means
entities that have not committed violations or have not been effected by such viola-
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and the CHA discriminated in public housing site selection in Chi-
cago with effects shown only in Chicago, the court could not require
non-liable suburbs to participate in the remedy. 26 Even so, the court
could require HUD and the CHA to exercise their statutory discre-
tion over existing Section 8 programs to provide suburban housing
opportunities for minority families.' 7 Thus Gautreaux permits
courts to order housing agencies to provide broad, affirmative relief
outside the specific site of the violation.
One appellate court extended Gautreaux reasoning to justify area-
wide injunctive relief against a housing agency in a school desegrega-
tion case. Yet the court failed to take full advantage of Gautreaux to
order affirmative housing remedies, despite a broader case for liabil-
ity throughout the housing actor's area of control. In United States v.
Board of School Commissioners (Indianapolis), 28 the court found
public housing officials guilty of intentionally discriminatory site se-
lection.'29 As in Gautreaux, the housing authority's area extended
tions. In Gautreaux, the Court found no interdistrict violation or effects. Id at 292,
294 n.11.
126. Id at 298, 305-06.
127. Id at 303-06. The Court noted that the Housing and Community Develop-
ment Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (Supp. III 1979) had enlarged HUD's role in
creating housing opportunities. The Act permitted HUD to contract directly with
private landlords to lease units to low income persons without local government ap-
proval, although local governments often had the right to comment. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1437f; 425 U.S. at 303-05.
128. 332 F. Supp. 655 (S.D. Ind. 1971), affd, 474 F.2d 81 (7th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 413 U.S. 920 (1973), 368 F. Supp. 1191 (S.D. Ind. 1973), aft'd, 503 F.2d 68
(7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 929 (1975), 419 F. Supp. 180 (S.D. Ind. 1975),
af'd, 541 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir. 1976), vacated and remanded, mem. sub noma. Board of
School Comm'rs v. Buckley, 429 U.S. 1068 (1977), 573 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1978), 456
F. Supp. 183 (S.D. Ind. 1978), 506 F. Supp. 657 (S.D. Ind.1979), afTd inpart, rev'din
part, 637 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 838 (1980).
129. 637 F.2d at 1111, 1114, 1117. Indianapolis is primarily a school desegrega-
tion case. The defendant school board originally crossolaimed against the public
housing authority in 1971, alleging that discriminatory housing policies contributed to
segregation of Indianapolis schools. 419 F. Supp. at 182. However, the district court
stayed the proceedings against the housing officials until 1974 after Justice Stewart
noted in Milliken that "purposeful, racially discriminatory use of state housing or
zoning laws" could justify a school desegregation decree. 418 U.S. 717, 755 (1974);
cited in 419 F. Supp. at 182.
The allegations against the public housing authority assumed a dual nature, due to
the dual remedies sought by plaintiffs. In response to the Seventh Circuit's test for an
interdistrict desegregation remedy, 637 F.2d at 1109, claimants alleged that intention-
ally discriminatory public housing site selection caused significant interdistrict segre-




beyond Indianapolis city limits into the suburbs."' 0 Unlike Gau-
treaux, however, the court found that its discriminatory public hous-
ing site selection effected residential segregation throughout its area
of control by containing minority public housing within Indianapolis
city limits. 3' But for this containment, many of the 5,000 minority
residents of public housing would have resided in the primarily white
suburbs.'32 The metropolitan-wide effects justified an injunction
prohibiting all further family public housing construction within In-
dianapolis, with the corollary assumption that defendants would con-
struct any future family public housing in the suburbs.
133
Because Indianapolis did not order an affirmative housing remedy
in the suburbs, the court did not take full advantage of the opportuni-
ties provided by Gautreaux.131 Since the court found effects in the
1109-111. The court determined that the public housing authority had constructed all
housing projects within the old central city of Indianapolis, despite its authority
throughout Marion County extending five miles beyond city limits. Projects that
housed families were 98% black. Further, the housing authority had made no serious
attempts to gain suburban municipalities' support for housing projects outside Indian-
apolis. The purpose was to keep blacks within Indianapolis and keep the suburban
areas segregated for whites only. Id at 1109-111. The Seventh Circuit found the
evidence sufficient to award a housing remedy, id at 1117, and a school remedy, id at
1114. The court enjoined further construction of family public housing in the city.
Id This housing remedy was a new development for school cases. See also Evans v.
Buchanan, 393 F. Supp. at 434, in which the court awarded only a school remedy in
response to state housing violations. Although the housing remedy in Indianapolis
reduces the housing authority's segregative impact on the schools, it also responds
directly to the housing harm resulting from the housing violations. Thus, from the
dual nature of the housing counts in Indianapolis, the authors derive two models for
school cases. Claimants may develop a housing case for the purpose of obtaining a
housing remedy that contributes to school desegregation, as presented in this model.
Additionally, claimants may develop a housing case for the primary purpose of ob-
taining school desegregation remedies, as illustrated in the next model, notes 162-206
and accompanying text infra.
130. 637 F.2d at 1109. See note 124 and accompanying text supra.
131. 637 F.2d at 1110.
132. The district court estimated that 4,958 black students from 2,395 housing
units would have resided in primarily white suburbs and attended desegregated sub-
urban schools had the housing authority located the public housing outside the old
city of Indianapolis. 506 F. Supp. at 664. Although the Seventh Circuit agreed with
the housing defendants that the judge may have miscalculated, the actual number was
not insignificant. 637 F.2d at 1114. The circuit court did not address the perhaps
more practical question of what the balance of housing between suburbs and Indian-
apolis should have been.
133. 506 F. Supp. at 665, 637 F.2d at 1117.
134. See note 127 and accompanying text supra.
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suburbs, it could have justified coercing suburban municipalities to
some degree.1 35 Both cases thus provided the opportunity for area-
wide remedies rather than site-specific relief.
2. Exclusionary Zoning Cases
Generally, exclusionary zoning reinforces segregation within the
municipality's area of control, but also affects the excluded minorities
outside the municipality.136 Traditionally, courts limited plaintiffs'
remedies to site-specific relief.'37 By presenting more comprehensive
evidence than that required in site-specific cases, plaintiffs in two re-
cent cases have argued for broader relief.
In Hope, Inc. v. County of DuPage, 3 plaintiffs brought a class ac-
tion under the equal protection clause, the Civil War statutes, and the
Fair Housing Act against an Illinois county outside of Chicago. 139
The plaintiffs alleged that the county's restrictive zoning and building
codes implemented a policy to exclude low and moderate income
non-residents, including minority families, from unincorporated ar-
135. In Gautreaux, the Court asserted that the Milliken test was not unique to
school desegregation cases, 425 U.S. at 294 n. 11; it extended to public housing cases as
well. Id at 294. Thus a court can exercise its remedial powers to "restructure the
operation of local and state government entities" wherever a court finds a constitu-
tional violation or its significant effects. Id at 293, 294, 296 n.12.
136. See, e.g., United States v. Parma, 661 F.2d at 566 (exclusionary zoning con-
tributed to racial disparity between Cleveland and suburbs); Metropolitan Hous. Dev.
Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1288 (exclusion of low to moderate
income housing for minorities reinforced Arlington Heights' almost totally white na-
ture in metropolitan area containing significant percentage of blacks); United States v.
City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1183 (suburb's exclusionary zoning enhanced disparity
between its 99% white population and 40% black population of the City of St. Louis).
137. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin (Penfield), 422 U.S. at 508 (required allegation of
harm entitling plaintiffs to site-specific remedy in order to grant standing); Metropoli-
tan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 616 F.2d at 1015 (approved
consent decree to construct low and moderate income housing units on newly an-
nexed land); Park View Heights v. City of Black Jack, 605 F.2d at 1040 (remanded for
plaintiffs plan for housing relief to remedy city's failure to construct 144 units of pub-
lic housing).
138. Planning for People Coalition v. DuPage County, 70 F.R.D. 38 (N.D. Ili.
1976) (standing), sub nonL Hope v. County of DuPage, (1981) Equal Opp. in Housing
(P-H) 15, 404 (N.D. Ill.) (liability).
139. 15, 404 at 15,998.308. Plaintiff class included persons residing within the
defendant county as well as outside the county. The defendants included the county,





eas of the county. 140 Defendants argued that the non-resident plain-
tiffs lacked standing since they could not demonstrate the county's
denial of a concrete project that would have benefitted them.141 Nev-
ertheless, the court granted standing because the county's housing
policies were so prohibitive that a knowledgeable developer would
not even attempt to apply for a permit. 42 To demonstrate intention-
140. Plaintiffs alleged that county zoning ordinances unreasonably increased the
cost of all housing, thereby increasing land costs. These higher costs prevented con-
struction of low and moderate income housing. The county's ordinance vested the
county board with "unfettered discretion" to grant or deny permits for multi-family
units, thus creating economic reasons for developers to carefully tailor development
proposals. County officials repeatedly expressed the desire to limit housing opportu-
nities to the wealthy. Zoning of agricultural areas for residential development elimi-
nated the possibility of industrial or commercial development that would have
lowered housing costs. The county and its housing authority had not built one unit of
public housing since 1942. Virtually all of the special use and zoning permits resulted
in development of residential housing for wealthy, white residents. Because of strong
economic incentives, developers had "acted in concert" with county officials to further
discriminatory housing practices. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants' practices resulted
in more expensive housing in unincorporated areas of the county, denying housing
opportunities to poor, black persons, while encouraging white, wealthy persons to
move into the county. Such acts contributed to racial polarization of the Chicago
metropolitan area. Schools became more segregated as well. Id at 15,998.308-.309.
141. 70 F.R.D. at 40. Defendants raised the standing issue subsequent to Warth.
Id The court noted that, as in Warth, individual plaintiffs alleged no direct injury to
an interest in land because they were not developers and they had not sought a permit
to construct housing. Id at 44. Unlike Warth, plaintiffs had defined a class that was
injured due to a conspiracy between the county and developers. Id at 44-45. Evi-
dence of a possibly effective and complete conspiracy convinced the court that plain-
tiffs could allege a personal interest. To deny them standing might reward a
"combined racial and economic discrimination which Warth specifically eschews."
Id at 46, 47. The court granted standing to the organizational plaintiff, Hope, Inc.,
under the Warth test because it had alleged injury to its members. Id at 47.
Defendants later asserted the related objection that plaintiffs failure to allege denial
of a specific concrete project rendered their claim not ripe for adjudication. The court
acknowledged that it had not determined that the developers conspired with the
county. The court, however, held that developers did not apply for permits to develop
low to moderate income projects because they were aware of the county's exclusion-
ary policies. A finding that the issue was not ripe for adjudication would only en-
courage defendants to be more discriminatory in their practices. Id
The court's holding accords with concerns expressed by Justice Brennan in Warth
v. Seldin (Penfield), 422 U.S. at 523 (court turns success of exclusionary scheme into a
barrier to a lawsuit). See also Mandelker, supra note 107, at 1239 (unless a munici-
pality has historically discriminated against proposals for subsidized housing, no op-
portunity presented to allege racially discriminatory intent); Sager, supra note 107, at
516. (Warth's "substantial probability" test requires plaintiffs be deprived of the ben-
efit itself, ignoring deprivation of the opportunity to secure a benefit).
142. Hope v. County of DuPage, 115,505 at 15,998.330.
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ally discriminatory policies and practices, plaintiffs presented evi-
dence that county actions satisfied a majority of theArlington Heights
criteria.' 43 Upon finding that the violations justified equitable relief,
the court asked the litigants to propose a remedy.' Plaintiffs recom-
mended that the court enjoin any further zoning approvals or build-
ing permits for new developments unless developers or the county
adequately provide for privately funded or publicly subsidized low
and moderate income housing.'45 Conceivably, plaintiffs' success in
proving a policy and practice of discrimination may justify such
broad scale relief.
A court actually ordered such broad scale relief in United States v.
Ci/y of Parma.146 In Parma, the Attorney General exercised his
unique statutory authority 4 7 to allege that city officials implemented
a pattern and practice of discrimination, thereby excluding minorities
from a Cleveland suburb. 148 Although the attorney general faced no
143. Id at 15,998.327-.328. First, the impact of the challenged action bore more
heavily on blacks than whites, effectively excluding blacks, and leaving a nearly 100%
white population. Secondly, a series of official actions revealed opposition to a dis-
criminatory purpose. These actions included: proposed integregated housing project,
the failure of the housing authority to build new public housing, and opposition to
possible applications for zoning variations and building permits for low to moderate
income housing. Finally, official activities and statements reflected a legislative and
administrative history of opposition to low and moderate income housing, including
housing for blacks. Id
144. Id at 15,998.331. The court held that county policies and practices consti-
tuted "a continuing threat of irreparable harm" warranting equitable relief. Id
145. Id at 15,998.308.
146. 494 F. Supp. 1049 (N.D. Ohio) (finding of liability), 504 F. Supp. 913 (N.D.
Ohio 1980) (order of remedy), af'dinpart, rev'd in part, 661 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3830 (U.S. April 20, 1982).
147. The Attorney General can bring civil action when she or he "has reasonable
cause to believe that any person or group of persons is engaged in a pattern and
practice" of discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (1976). The Attorney General alleged a
pattern and practice of discrimination by the suburban municipality of Parma, Ohio,
in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604 (refusal to sell or rent), and 3617 (interference, coer-
cion, or intimidation).
148. The District Court found that an "extreme condition of racial segregation
exists in the Cleveland metropolitan area," 494 F. Supp. at 1055, with 90% of the
blacks living in Cleveland. Id at 1056. Although the metropolitan area was 16%
black and Parma was Cleveland's largest suburb, Parma's black population was a
fraction of one percent. Id at 1056-57.
The district court denied two Parma rationales for the segregated condition of the
metropolitan area. Parma alleged that blacks, like other ethnic groups, preferred to
associate with each other, and migrated along natural "ethnic corridors" from the city




standing problems, he had to satisfy the stricter test for proving a
pervasive pattern and practice of discrimination.' 49 The test required
"more than an isolated incident of discrimination."' 50 Defendants
must have implemented a discriminatory policy, statute, or ordinance
that caused significant segregative effects. 151 In affirming the district
court's judgment against the city, the Sixth Circuit approved ex-
tremely intrusive, broad remedies, not limited to site-specific relief. 52
had been continuously discriminated against in the housing market. The court also
found it "simply not plausible to believe that the supposed preferences of blacks to
live in black neighborhoods would subordinate people's desire to lead better lives."
494 F. Supp. at 1060-61. The district court also rejected Parma's explanation that
economic factors explained racial patterns. An expert witness presented statistical
evidence showing that if residential location were based on socio-economic factors,
blacks would be dispersed throughout the metropolitan area. Parma's black popula-
tion would be 12.7% instead of a fraction of one percent. Id. at 1063.
Consequently, the Sixth Circuit affirmed district court findings that
[R]ejection of the fair housing resolution, the consistent refusal to sign a coopera-
tion agreement with CMHA, the adamant and long-standing opposition to any
form of public or low-income housing, the denial of the building permit for
Parmatown Woods, the passage of the 35-foot height restriction ordinance, the
passage of the ordinance requiring voter approval for low-income housing, and
the refusal to submit an adequate housing assistance plan in the Community
Block Development Grant application, individually and collectively, were moti-
vated by a racially discriminatory and exclusionary intent. The purpose of these
actions, the Court finds, was to exclude blacks from residing in Parma and to
maintain the segregated "character" of the City. These actions individually and
collectively, also violated the Fair Housing Act by denying to blacks, Parma resi-
dents, and prospective low-income housing developers rights secured by Sections
804(a) and 817.
494 F. Supp. at 1096.
149. 494 F. Supp. at 1095; 42 U.S.C. § 3617 (1976). According to the district
court, "the government must prove more than an isolated incident of unlawful dis-
crimination." 494 F. Supp. at 1095. The unlawful discrimination must have been a
regular procedure that defendant followed through actions or failure to act. A dis-
criminatory policy, statute, or ordinance constitutes a discriminatory pattern or prac-
tice. Further, the failure to eliminate a policy that prevents fair housing is a pattern
or practice. Id
150. 494 F. Supp. at 1095. Accord, United States v. Pelzer Realty Co. (Montgom-
ery), 484 F.2d 438, 445 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974).
151. 494 F. Supp. at 1095.
152. The district court issued a four point injunction prohibiting Parma and its
employees from engaging in further segregative housing practices; ordered Parma to
develop a fair housing education program for officials and employees; ordered enact-
ment of a fair housing resolution; required Parma to advertise itself as an "equal
housing opportunity community" through regional newspapers; vacated a discrimina-
tory low income housing ordinance; and modified height limitations, parking, and
zoning referendum ordinances to prevent their application to low and moderate in-
come housing. The court further ordered Parma to take five actions to increase the
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Both Hope, Inc. and Parma provide new methods for proving lia-
bility justifying broad, systemwide relief. Both require more than an
isolated incident that would justify only site-specific relief. Hope,
Inc. requires a showing of racial discrimination that would satisfy
equal protection standards for intent. Parma requires that the attor-
ney general prove a pervasive pattern and practice of discrimination.
Unlike school desegregation cases, 153 neither case considers the pos-
sibility of remedying the effects outside the liable actor's area of
control. 154
Thus recent developments in site selection and exclusionary zoning
cases support an expanded scope of housing remedies. Courts may
utilize the greater capabilities of certain housing agencies to provide
metropolitan remedies outside the specific area of the violation. Fur-
ther, when plaintiffs prove pervasive patterns of discrimination by
defendants, courts may order more intrusive and comprehensive
housing remedies.
C. Applications of Housing Remedies in School Cases
Plaintiffs in school desegregation cases may find it in their best in-
terests to allege a housing count. Where segregated neighborhoods
low income housing supply: (1) form a Fair Housing Committee to develop the reme-
dial plan, and an Evaluation Committee to review its work; (2) cooperate with the
county housing authority or form its own authority to develop public housing; (3) de-
velop a program for interjurisdictional use of Section 8 existing housing programs;
(4) proceed with its Community Development Block Grant application; and (5) en-
sure construction of 133 units per year of public housing. Finally, the district court
appointed a special master to ensure that Parma implement the remedial order. 504
F. Supp. at 918-26.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed most of the district court's order. 661 F.2d at 576-78.
However, it struck the threshhold requirement of 133 units as "premature," and left
the determination of the number of units needed to the Fair Housing Committee. Id
at 577-78. The circuit court also vacated the appointment of a Special Master, finding
that the Fair Housing and Evaluation Committees provided adequate assistance to
the court and less intrusion in achieving the government's fair housing goal. Id at
578-79.
153. See notes 56-66 and accompanying text supra.
154. In Hope v. County of DuPage, the court found that defendant's zoning prac-
tices effectively excluded nonwhite residents. 15,404 at 15,998.312-.313, 15,998.327.
Yet plaintiffs sought relief within the county, not outside. 15,404 at 15,998.308. In
Parma, the court found that the city's exclusionary practices contributed to metropol-
itan-wide racial disparity, 661 F.2d at 566, and focused most of the remedy on Parma
alone. Id at 576-78. However, the requirement that Parma advertise in regional
newspapers its willingness to welcome minority residents may have some county-wide




exist, neighborhood school systems will inevitably be segregated re-
gardless of the school board's intent.'55 In addition, housing reme-
dies themselves may contribute to school desegregation as well. For
example, remedies that disperse public housing for minority families
into primarily white neighborhoods may cause the natural integra-
tion of surrounding neighborhood schools, reducing the need for bus-
ing.156 Alternatively, injunctions preventing housing agencies from
constructing minority housing in heavily minority neighborhoods




By presenting the housing count separately, plaintiffs may avoid
difficult problems of merging the standards and tests of school cases
with those of housing cases.' 58 Courts may be more receptive to
cases argued within their traditional framework.' 59 By arguing the
155. Cf. notes 175-76 infra.
156. In Adams v. United States (St. Louis), 620 F.2d 1277, 1293, & n.23 (8th Cir.
1980), the Department of Justice supported the court expert's recommendation to ex-
empt from busing schools with enrollments 30 to 50% black in integrated neighbor-
hoods. The circuit court recommended this approach as one option to the district
court. Id at 1295-96. See Taylor, Remarks of William L. Taylor, 23 HOWARD L.J.
113, 118 (1980), which discusses the desegregation plan in Louisville, Kentucky. Pro-
fessor Taylor related that after the desegregation order exempted racially desegre-
gated neighborhoods from busing, the head of the Kentucky Human Rights
Commission successfully persuaded city and county housing authorities to counsel
black applicants to reside in white communities. Id See also D. Pierce, Breaking
Down Barriers: New Evidence of the Impact of Metropolitan School Desegregation
on Housing Patterns 1, 4 (Nov. 1980) (Final Report submitted to the National Insti-
tute of Education) (suggests that metropolitan school desegregation may increase
housing integration by removing an incentive for whites to flee; may also provide
incentive for integration by exempting neighborhoods from busing programs).
157. See, e.g., United States v. Board of School Comm'rs (Indianapolis), 419 F.
Supp. at 186, aft'd, 541 F.2d at 1223.
158. See notes 167-99 and accompanying text infra.
159. Despite a relatively large number of opinions alleging the causal relationship
between school segregation and housing segregation, see note 2 and accompanying
text supra, courts have rendered few decisions based on the interrelationship. See
note 99 supra. Plaintiffs have successfully pled that a state housing agency caused
school segregation in only one case, Evans v. Buchanan (Wilmington), 393 F. Supp. at
438, although defendant school officials successfully crossclaimed against the housing
authority in United States v. Board of School Comm'rs (Indianapolis), 637 F.2d at
1111. But see Bell v. Board of Educ. (Akron), 491 F. Supp. at 943-48, in which plain-
tiffs failed to prove housing actors intentionally caused school segregation, and Hart
v. Community School Bd. (Brooklyn), 383 F. Supp. at 775, in which the court deter-
mined a housing decree to be unworkable. Three justices of the Supreme Court have
signalled their strong hesitancy to attribute housing segregation to school authorities.
In Austin Indep. School Dist. v. United States, 429 U.S. 990, 994 (1976), Justices
Powell, Burger, and Rehnquist concurred in vacating a school case and stated
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counts jointly, however, plaintiffs may have an impact on the reme-
dies awarded. The court may tend to structure the remedies to rein-
force each other to ensure that school and housing policies do not
work at cross purposes.160 Indianapolis provides the only example to
The principal cause of racial and ethnic imbalance in urban public schools across
the county-North and South-is the imbalance in residential patterns. Such
residential patterns are typically beyond the control of school authorities. For
example, discrimination in housing-whether public or private--cannot be at-
tributed to school authorities. Economic pressures and voluntary preferences are
the primary determinants of residential patterns.
Id Other attempts to prove that school acts cause housing violations with actionable
school effects have been unsuccessful to date. See notes 207-63 and accompanying
text infra. In Liddell v. Board of Educ. (St. Louis), 469 F. Supp. 1304 (E.D. Mo.
1979), Motion of the Board for Leave to Amend its Answer to Add a Cross Claim
(Jan. 9, 1981), cross-claimants appear to have alleged an actional housing violation by
school officials. See notes 327-30 and accompanying text infra. Consequently, plain-
tiffs may be well advised to present a housing count on its own terms wherever possi-
ble, alleging that it contributes to school segregation. Discussion of a school count in
a housing case is beyond the scope of this Note.
160. Federal housing policy appears to reflect dual, contradictory standards. The
Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, § 101(c), 42 U.S.C. § 5301(c)
(1976), lists as its primary objective the "development of viable urban communities,
by providing decent housing and suitable living environment and expanding eco-
nomic opportunities, preferably for persons with low and moderate income". Id
The specific objectives within that subsection include elimination of slums and blight
where low and moderate income persons reside. Id at § 5301(c)(1), (2)(3). Another
goal is "the promotion of an increase in the diversity and vitality of neighborhoods
through the spatial deconcentration of housing opportunities for persons of lower in-
come." Id at § 5301(c)(6). Thus the objectives appear to be improvement of the
neighborhoods where low income persons reside and promotion of dispersal. Project
Selection Criteria, 24 C.F.R. §§ 200.700-.710 (1981), requiring HUD to consider the
impact on currently integrated neighborhoods of proposed public housing, seem to
reinforce the dispersal orientation. See Shannon v. United States Dep't. of Housing
and Urban Dev. (Philadelphia), 436 F.2d 809, 821-22 (3d Cir. 1970) (HUD must con-
sider impact of proposed public housing on racial balance in the area). But see the
recent Young Amendment, Act of October 8, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-399, § 216, 94 Stat.
1638 (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1436(b)), that states, "The Secretary of Housing
and Urban Development shall not exclude from consideration for financial assistance
under federally assisted housing programs proposals for housing projects solely be-
cause the site proposed is located within an impacted area." Id
It appears that placing public housing in racially impacted areas will not contribute
to school desegregation; in fact, it would exacerbate it. United States v. Board of
School Comm'rs (Indianapolis), 637 F.2d at 1117 (discriminatory site selection by
public housing authority, placing all public housing in racially impacted Indianapolis
rather than the primarily white suburbs, caused racial segregation in the schools justi-
fying an interdistrict school remedy and injunction against further public housing
construction in Indianapolis). The Indianapolis concern that public housing must not
hamper desegregation is supported by HUD regulations issued during President




date of joint school and housing remedies in a school case. The Indi-
anapolis court enjoined construction of public housing in the central
city. Thus the court ensured that the housing authority would not
exacerbate school segregation by requiring the agency to support
school integration through construction in primarily white sub-
urbs. 6' Thus the housing count provides the means to reach non-
school actors whose violations reinforce school segregation, and to
require them to enhance desegration.
D. Summary
Although housing and school segregation often appear to be caus-
ally connected, housing law has developed separately from school
law. In addition to the equal protection standards employed in
school cases, plaintiffs may bring housing cases under less strict statu-
tory standards. Nevertheless, the fragmented nature of housing vio-
lations, combined with judicial deference to municipalities and
federal agencies, traditionally have limited housing remedies to site-
specific relief. In recent cases, however, where plaintiffs satisifed
more stringent standards of proof and established patterns and prac-
tices of discrimination, courts awarded broad relief throughout the
actors' control. The willingness of courts to pursue this trend remains
uncertain.
The next section will analyze a hybrid model, derived from the
pure housing model, in which plaintiffs allege that intentional hous-
ing acts caused segregated schools.
III. HOUSING VIOLATIONS CAUSE SCHOOL EFFECTS
Courts have noted, and school defendants have argued, that segre-
gated residential patterns not only reinforce but also cause school
segregation. 62 In past school cases, when school defendants success-
consider both residential and school impacts in reviewing housing proposals where a
school remedy is in operation. Notice H-S1-2 (HUD), Clarification of Site and
Neighborhood Standards for New Assisted Housing Projects in Areas of Minority
Concentration (Jan. 5, 1981). Thus, for school and housing remedies to reinforce
each other, they must promote dispersal.
161. 637 F.2d I101 at 1117. See note 160 supra.
162. See Milliken v. Bradley (Detroit), 418 U.S. 717, 755, 756 n.2 (1974) (Stewart,
J., concurring). Justice Stewart stated that a school desegregation remedy might be
proper where state officials contributed to separation of races by purposeful, racially
discriminatory use of state housing or zoning laws. For cases in which litigants suc-
cessfully argued that government housing officials caused school segregation, see
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fully asserted that they were not responsible for segregated schools,
United States v. Board of School Comm'rs (Indianapolis), 419 F. Supp. 180, 182 (S.D.
Ind. 1975) (defendant school board alleged and court found that discriminatory site
selection by public housing officials caused residential and school segregation, justify-
ing housing injunction and interdistrict school remedy), all'd, 541 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir.
1976), vacated and remanded on other grounds mem. sub nom. Board of School
Comm'rs v. Buckley, 429 U.S. 1068 (1977); Evans v. Buchanan (Wilmington), 393 F.
Supp. 428,436-38 (D. Del.) (plaintiffs alleged and court found that government hous-
ing policies assisted, encouraged, and authorized public and private discrimination in
housing, causing interdistrict school segregation, justifying an interdistrict school
remedy), affd memn, 423 U.S. 963 (1975). Litigants unsuccessfully attempted to in-
clude housing officials in the remedy in Bell v. Board of Educ. (Akron), 491 F. Supp.
916, 943-48 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (plaintiffs failed to prove that Ohio Real Estate Com-
mission, City of Akron, and city housing authority used urban renewal and public
housing programs to intentionally segregate housing, thus affecting schools); Hart v.
Community School Bd. of Educ. (Brooklyn), 383 F. Supp. 699, 706-07, 757-58
(E.D.N.Y.) (defendant school board impleaded city, state, and federal housing offi-
cials, alleging that intentional acts of public housing officials racially tipped the neigh-
borhood, causing segregated schools; court ordered housing officials to develop a joint
plan), modfled, 383 F. Supp. 769, 775 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (after housing officials failed
to agree on joint plan, court determined that housing decree unworkable), aft'd, 512
F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975). For cases in which litigants are currently alleging that inten-
tional housing acts caused school segregation, see United States v. Yonkers Bd. of
Educ., 518 F. Supp. 191, 193, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (plaintiffs alleged that city and
community development agency discriminated in public housing site selection, per-
petuating and aggravating school segregation; court refused to separate the housing
count from claim against school officials); Liddell v. Board of Educ. (St. Louis), 469
F. Supp. 1304 (E.D. Mo. 1979), Order (Aug. 24, 1981) (plaintiff intervenors and de-
fendant school board cross claimed against housing agencies for reinforcing and caus-
ing segregated schools, but district court stayed motion against most of housing
parties), remandedfor want of jurisdiction, No. 81-1828, slip op. at 43 (8th Cir. Feb. 25,
1982). For cases in which defendant school officials unsuccessfully argued that pub-
lic and/or private acts of residential segregation independent of intentional acts of
school officials caused school segregation, see, e.g., Penick v. Columbus Bd. of Educ.,
429 F. Supp. 229, 259 (S.D. Ohio 1977) (housing segregation in part caused by federal
agencies, local housing authorities, restrictive covenants, zoning and annexation, and
private action promoting segregation in schools; nevertheless, demographic change is
no defense since school defendants should have acted to "break the segregative snow-
ball". afl'd and remanded, 583 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1978), affTd, 443 U.S. 449 (1979);
Reed v. Rhodes (Cleveland), 422 F. Supp. 708, 789-90 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (racially
segregated public housing in conjunction with school board policies operated to
spawn segregated schools; because the school board knowingly incorporated govern-
mentally caused residential segregation into their neighborhood school policy, they
cannot claim residential segregation as a defense), remandedfor reconsideration, 559
F.2d 1220 (6th Cir. 1977). Arthur v. Nyquist (Buffalo), 415 F. Supp. 904, 968
(W.D.N.Y. 1976) (fact that residential segregation substantially caused by public and
private actions resulting in segregated schools is not a defense for school officials who
were aware of residential segregation and failed to alleviate it in their school polices),
afid, 573 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 860 (1978); Morgan v. Henni-




courts refused to grant a school remedy. 6 ' In Milliken, however, Jus-
tice Stewart stated that an interdistrict school remedy might be ap-
propriate if public officials contributed to segregated schools by
racially discriminatory use of state housing or zoning laws.)" His
formulation suggests that dual effects of residential and school segre-
gation may result from intentional housing discrimination, and both
may be subject to a remedy.
The independent evolution of school and housing case law raises
particular problems in fusing the unique requirements of school and
housing cases. Courts must determine how housing acts can cause
school effects, and resolve the appropriate standards for intent, stand-
ing, and significance of effect.' 65 The Indianapolis court has applied a
test for establishing liability of housing officials sufficient to justify
housing and school remedies.' 66 The following subsection will ex-
amine some of the problems encountered in merging housing and
school cases under the Indianapolis test, and discuss the scope of
housing and school remedies that plaintiffs may obtain.
A. Problems Encountered in Proving Housing Actors Caused
Actionable School Effects: The Indianapolis Test
Although Justice Stewart stated that discriminatory housing acts
may justify an interdistrict school desegregation remedy,'67 he did
not address the difficult questions posed by merging a housing cause
of action with the strict standards of school cases. Following Justice
Stewart's dictum, the Indianapolis court' 68 developed a four part test
for determining whether housing violations justified school desegre-
patterns caused school segregation unacceptable when school officials intentionally
incorporated residential segregation into the system's schools), affidsub non?. Morgan
v. Hennigan, 509 F.2d 580 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975).
163. See, e.g., Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 436 (1976)
(demographic shifts in residential patterns causing segregation of schools not attribu-
table to intentional acts of school officials); Milliken v. Bradley (Detroit), 418 U.S. at
745, 752 (absent a showing of an interdistrict constitutional violation or effect, court
may not order metropolitan school consolidation).
164. 418 U.S. at 755.
165. See notes 167-99 and accompanying text infra.
166. United States v. Board of School Comm'rs (Indianapolis), 637 F.2d 1101,
1109 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 838 (1980). See notes 167-70 and accom-
panying text infra.
167. 418 U.S. at 755.
168. United States/v. Board of School Comm'rs (Indianapolis), 637 F.2d at 1109.
1982]
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
gation remedies. 169 The court framed the test so broadly that it left
many issues unresolved. Therefore, traditional school and housing
cases must be analyzed to determine the meaning of the Indianapolis
test's requirements.'
70
Where school plaintiffs are unable to prove that school officials in-
tentionally caused segregated schools, they may seek to sue housing
actors who caused the school effects. Should plaintiffs convince the
courts that housing actors were liable for causing segregated schools,
the courts may order the non-liable school districts to participate in
the remedy.' 7 ' Such an order is no different than requiring non-lia-
ble school boards to remedy the segregative effects of another school
board's intentional violation.
Plaintiffs face, however, the critical issue of standing not addressed
by the Indianapolis test. Under the holdings of some equal protection
cases, school plaintiffs may have difficulty gaining standing against
housing actors. 172 Housing defendants may assert they are incapable
of remedying the school effects of their violations, 173 and, therefore,
169. Id The circuit court had instructed the district court as follows:
[Ain interdistrict desegregation remedy is appropriate if the following circum-
stances are shown to exist (given the fact that there is a vast racial disparity be-
tween IPS and the surrounding school districts within the "new" City of
Indianapolis): (1) that discriminatory practices have caused segregative residen-
tial housing patterns and population shifts; (2) that state action, at whatever
level, by either direct or indirect action, initiated, supported, or contributed to
these practices and the resulting housing patterns and population shifts; and
(3) that although the state action need not be the sole cause of these effects, it
must have had a significant rather than a de minimis effect. Finally, an interdis-
trict remedy may be appropriate even though the state discriminatory housing
practices have ceased if it is shown that prior discriminatory practices have a
continuing segregative effect on housing patterns (and, in turn, on school attend-
ance patterns) within the Indianapolis metropolitan area.Id
170. Note that the Indianapolis test requires plaintiffs to prove a housing case in
which discriminatory practices of government officials caused significant segregative
housing effects with a continuing effect in school patterns. Id. at 1109. The test did
not address standing problems presented for school plaintiffs or school board defend-
ants presenting a counterclaim. See notes 172-79 and accompanying text infra.
171. 637 F.2d at 1114. See note 202 and accompanying text infra.
172. See notes 107-08, 141-42 and accompanying text supra.
173. Defendants may allege that plaintiffs do not meet standing requirements on
constitutional or prudential grounds. Under Warth v. Seldin (Penfield), 422 U.S. 490,
498-508 (1978), plaintiffs must have suffered some threatened or actual injury result-
ing from the allegedly illegal action, giving the plaintiff a "personal stake in the out-
come." The asserted injury must be the consequence of defendant's action. Finally,




school plaintiffs lack standing for failure to allege a causal link be-
tween the violation and remedy. 74 Plaintiffs have three alternative
responses to the housing actor's contention that they lack standing.
First, if plaintiffs can allege specific housing harm, such as that
presented by occupants of segregated public housing,"7 5 they can ob-
tain standing on housing grounds.7 6 Once the housing actors are
parties in the case, plaintiffs can then allege the school harm as well.
Secondly, plaintiffs may argue that an injunction may reduce dis-
criminatory housing impacts upon the schools. 7 Therefore, a rem-
edy is available for the school harm caused by the housing actors.
Finally, plaintiffs may allege that absent the *opportunity to prove
constitutional violations by school officials, their segregative school
effects would remain without a remedy. Traditional equitable doc-
trine provides that parties harmed deserve the opportunity to seek a
remedy.' Plaintiffs' successful presentation of any of these theories
School Dist. of Kansas City v. Missouri, 460 F. Supp. 421, 437 (W.D. Mo. 1978),
appeal dismissed, 592 F.2d 493 (8th Cir. 1979). Defendants may allege either that
they have no responsibility for public schools or that a housing remedy would not
redress plaintiff's school harm. See Note, Housing Remedies in School Desegregation
Cases: The View From Indianapolis, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 649, 687 ("orders
remedying discrimination in housing will not automatically lead to school integra-
tion"). Defendants may also allege that plaintiffs are barred under prudential limita-
tions for stating a "generalized grievance" shared in substantially equal measure by
all or a large class of citizens." 422 U.S. at 499. See generally note 107 supra. Contra,
School Dist. of Kansas City v. Missouri, 460 F. Supp. at 443-44 (plaintiff school chil-
dren granted standing to challenge HUD actions allegedly causing school segregation,
even though plaintiffs not beneficiaries of HUD programs). See note 177 infra.
174. Defendants alleged a similar claim in Hope, Inc. v. County of DuPage,
(1981) Equal Opp. in Housing (P-H) 15,404 at 15,998.330 (N.D. Ill.). See note 141
and accompanying text supra.
175. Eg., United States v. Board of School Comm'rs (Indianapolis), 506 F. Supp.
657, 664 (S.D. Ind. 1979) (nearly 5,000 black students represented in class action re-
sided in public housing), affdinpart, rev'd in part, 637 F.2d 1101, 1109-10 (7th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 838 (1980). See note 132 and accompanying text supra.
176. 637 F.2d at 1104.
177. Id at 1109. In School Dist. of Kansas City v. Missouri, 460 F. Supp. at 443-
44, defendant HUD alleged that plaintiffs, including the school board and school chil-
dren represented by their parents, id at 427, lacked standing to challenge actions of
HUD on grounds that plaintiffs were not beneficiaries of HUD programs allegedly
administered in a discriminatory manner. The court dismissed defendant's claim,
stating that plaintiffs constitutional rights are not dependent on whether they are
direct recipients of the housing. It was sufficient that plaintiffs alleged that HUD and
other federal agency practices were conducted in such a discriminatory manner as to
cause school segregation. Id at 444.
178. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229, 238-39 (1969) (where plaintiffs'
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should prevent housing officials from successfully using the shield of
standing to avoid liability. Once housing actors are parties in the
case, plaintiffs may reach non-liable school districts to participate in
the remedy.17
9
Assuming the court allows plaintiffs seeking a school remedy to
bring housing defendants into the suit, plaintiffs may have to satisfy
the four part test of Indianapolis to establish a housing defendant's
liability. 8 ° It requires that discriminatory housing practices must
have caused segregated housing patterns. Furthermore, direct or in-
direct state action must have initiated, supported, or contributed to
these practices. If state action was not the sole cause of housing seg-
regation, it must have had a significant effect. Even if the housing
practices have ceased, their continuing segregative effect on housing
patterns and, in turn, on school attendance patterns may warrant an
interdistrict remedy.'1
8
The test thus presents three critical problems that courts must re-
solve before fashioning a school remedy based upon a housing ac-
tions discriminatory action. First, how can state housing officials
cause segregated schools? Secondly, what is the standard for deter-
mining an act was discriminatory? Finally, when are the effects sig-
nificant enough to warrant a school remedy?
Evans v. Buchanan (Wilmington)1 2 illustrates several examples of
housing acts found to cause segregative school effects that justified an
interdistrict remedy. The court determined that two decades of dem-
ographic changes had caused the net outmigration of white residents
and the net increase of minority residents in the City of Wilmington,
resulting in segregated neighborhood schools. 183 Government poli-
rights violated under 42 U.S.C. § 1982 and statute failed to provide an explicit
method of enforcement or designate damages, the existence of a statutory right im-
plies the existence of all necessary and proper remedies); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co. (St. Louis County), 392 U.S. 409, 414-15 (1968) (42 U.S.C. § 1982 enforceable
despite omission of express means of enforcement); Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v.
Village of Arlington Heights, 469 F. Supp. 836, 858, & n.23 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (consent
decree approving city's annexation of land to remedy effects of exclusionary zoning
when no land available within present city boundaries within equitable powers of the
court), afid, 616 F.2d 1006 (7th Cir. 1980).
179. 637 F.2d at 1114. See note 202 and accompanying text infra.
180. Id at 1109.
181. Id
182. 393 F. Supp. at 432-38.




cies, not just residential choice and economics, had contributed to
demographic changes in several ways. 184  The Federal Housing
Agency and the Delaware Real Estate Commission promoted and
encouraged racial steering." 5 State and local officials had enforced
racially restrictive convenants. 186 Additionally, the public housing.
authority had concentrated virtually all public housing units within
the City of Wilmington. 87 Thus government acts had racially identi-
fied neighborhoods throughout the metropolitan area, which in turn
racially identified the schools.188
In addition to proving that defendants' acts caused school effects,
plaintiffs must prove the acts were "discriminatory. ' 189 While school
cases have required that the acts be intentional,' 9 housing cases have
primarily relied on loose statutory standards requiring less than in-
tent. 19' Because a statutory housing violation would not satisfy the
equal protection standard required in school cases, courts presuma-
bly would require a finding of segregative intent before ordering a
school desegregation remedy. 192 Although plaintiffs must prove in-
184. Id
185. Id The 1936 Federal Housing Administration Mortgage Underwriting Man-
ual, continued in use until 1949, advocated racially homogenous neighborhoods. The
Delaware Real Estate Commission, responsible for licensing realtors, encouraged ra-
cial discrimination by private parties in the sale or rental of private housing until
1968, and advocated racial steering until 1970. Id at 434-35.
186. Id at 434. They enforced racially restrictive convenants until 1973. Id
187. Id at 435. Until 1972, the housing authority constructed over 98% of 2,000
public housing units within the Wilmington city limits despite its authority to build
up to five miles beyond city limits. Id
188. Id at 437-38. The court noted that racial imbalance in housing contributed
to the racial imbalance in schools. Id at 437, citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg,
402 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1971). Although suburban districts converted to unitary systems
after Brown I, government authorities continued to condone discrimination in the
private housing market and to provide segregated public housing within Wilmington,
thus causing corresponding continuing segregative effects in the schools. 393 F.
Supp. at 437-38.
189. United States v. Board of School Comm'rs (Indianapolis), 637 F.2d at 1109.
See note 169 supra. The Circuit Court noted that "discriminatory" meant the intent
requirement applied. Id at 1109. Merger of housing and school requirements, how-
ever, requires an analysis of the appropriate standard.
190. See note 28 and accompanying text supra.
191. See notes 105, 109 and accompanying text supra.
192. 637 F.2d at 1109. The Seventh Circuit derived its test from Justice Stewart's
concurrence in Milliken, 418 U.S. at 755, that expanded on the majority's test for
interdistrict school liability. Id at 745. The majority provided that "racially discrim-
inatory acts of the state or local school districts" could justify an interdistrict remedy.
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tent to racially discriminate in housing, courts do not appear to re-
quire that government housing actors must have intended the school
effects.' 93 This accords with the language of Milliken194 and Gau-
/reaux,195 which does not require that the guilty party intend all of
the effects of his actions. Thus courts may remedy even unintended
or continuing housing and school effects of intentional housing
violations.
Once plaintiffs prove intentional acts of housing officials caused
segregative effects, they must also show that the school effects were of
sufficient magnitude to justify systemwide desegregation 96 or an in-
terdistrict school remedy.197 Absent clear standards in school cases,
it is difficult to determine the number of persons who must be af-
fected to justify a school remedy. The interdistrict cases provide lim-
ited guidance as to the meaning of "significant." For example, two
courts concluded that the interdistrict effect of busing a small number
of school children for discriminatory purposes was de minims.198 On
Id Justice Stewart applied the same language of "racially discriminatory" to the acts
of housing officials that could warrant an interdistrict school remedy. Id at 755. The
Seventh Circuit stated that Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), had imposed
objective intent standards on the finding of racially discriminatory actions within the
meaning of the equal protection clause. 573 F.2d at 410-13.
Although the equal protection intent standard may be the appropriate standard to
use, the court failed to consider whether the merger of school and housing tests could
permit a statutory effects standard to be applied. This possible approach warrants
consideration because the Indianapolis test focuses on the housing acts, with the
school effects appearing almost incidental. 637 F.2d at 1109. The test appears to
equate housing and school effects. Conceivably, however, a court may find that ef-
fects deemed "significant" in housing may not be "significant" in the schools. The
Indianapolis court's reliance on Milliken, 637 F.2d at 1104-05, suggests the test would
require school effects be significant as well.
193. 637 F.2d at 1109. The test permits the segregative school effects to be reme-
died even if the discriminatory housing acts have ceased, as long as the prior housing
practices had a "continuing" segregative effect on housing and, in turn, on school
patterns. Id
194. 418 U.S. at 745. See note 54 supra.
195. 425 U.S. at 296 & n.12.
196. The Indianapolis test apparently applies only to an interdistrict desegregation
remedy. 637 F.2d at 1109. However, if government housing violations can justify an
interdistrict school remedy, there is no reason why such violations may not warrant a
single district school remedy.
197. Id.
198. Milliken v. Bradley (Detroit), 418 U.S. at 749-50 ("isolated instance" of sub-
urban school district's transfer of black high school students to Detroit black school
had de minimis effect); Tasby v. Estes (Dallas), 572 F.2d 1010, 1015 & n.19 (5th Cir.




the other hand, segregative housing of 5,000 minority residents in In-
dianapolis was "significant." 199 The threshold of significance pre-
sumably lies somewhere in between.
Thus, problems of standing, cause, intent, and quantification de-
rived from housing and school cases carry into this hybrid model of
liability. These problems further complicate the tasks of litigants and
the courts. The next subsection will address the opportunity afforded
by this model to gain school and housing remedies.
B. Scope of Remedies
School and housing cases have differed in remedies provided. In
school cases, courts on occasion have accepted evidence of extradis-
trict effects to support school desegregation remedies beyond the in-
tentional actor's area of control.'o° In housing cases, on the other
hand, courts have restricted their remedies to the intentional housing
violator's area of control.2 '
Consequently, when school and housing effects result from an in-
tentional housing violation, the remedies may differ depending on
whether the proven effects are within or outside the housing violator's
area of control. Indianapolis exemplifies a case in which the housing
and school effects took place within the geographical authority of the
housing authority.2 "2 While acknowledging that it was not address-
rant inclusion of suburban school district), cert. dimissed sub nom Estes v. Metropol-
itan Branches of Dallas N.A.A.C.P., 444 U.S. 437 (1980).
199. 506 F. Supp. at 664.
200. See notes 83-85 and accompanying text supra.
201. Hills v. Gautreaux (Chicago), 425 U.S. at 294 n.l 1. See notes 122-27, 134-35,
154 and accompanying text upra.
202. 637 F.2d at 1109, 1114. Indianapolis involved two separate allegations found
to justify an interdistrict school remedy. In 1969, the state legislature authorized con-
solidation of all of Marion County into a new City of Indianapolis, titled Uni-Gov.
Sixteen days prior to the Un-Gov legislation, the legislature repealed a 1961 act that
would have required school district boundaries to consolidate as well. The Uni-Gov
procedures were held to cause interdistrict violations justifying a school desegregation
remedy throughout the Uni-Gov area of Marion County. Id at 1106-08, 1114. The
second violation involved the housing authority's discriminatory siting of public
housing. This action affected housing and school patterns throughout the agency's
area of authority, that extended five miles beyond the old city limits. The court noted
that "if this were the only constitutional violation present. . ., an appropriate remedy
... would have to be limited to the territory within the (housing agency's) area of
operation at the time the projects were built." Id at 1114. This language implies that
the housing violation alone could justify a school remedy.
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ing the issue of whether the housing authority's violation affected
schools outside of its area of control,203 the court held that its viola-
tions justified the participation of non-liable school boards in the
remedy within the authority's boundaries.2" Theoretically, an exclu-
sionary zoning case such as Hope, Inc. 205 might justify a varied set of
remedies. For example, where the effects of intentional housing vio-
lations reach beyond county boundaries, courts may restrict housing
remedies to the county while ordering multi-county school desegre-
gation. Thus minority residents conceivably would be entitled either
to participate in interdistrict busing or to take advantage of housing
opportunities within the county.20 6
C. Summary of the Hybrid Housing Model
In Indianapolis, Justice Stewart's dictum came to fruition when the
court ordered housing and school remedies in response to proven
housing segregation. For purposes of analysis, the Seventh Circuit
developed a test that requires a showing that discriminatory housing
violations by government actors contributed to significant, continuing
housing and school effects. This merger of housing and school liabil-
ity still leaves many issues of standing, cause, intent, significance of
effects, and the scope of remedies unresolved. The next section will
address a second hybrid model derived from a pure school model
that contains similar issues.
IV. SCHOOL VIOLATIONS CAUSE HOUSING EFFECTS THAT CAUSE
SCHOOL EFFECTS
Chief Justice Burger noted that school board acts such as decisions
to construct or demolish schools "may well promote segregated resi-
dential patterns which, when combined with 'neighborhood zoning'
further lock the school system into separation of the races." 20 7 Sub-
sequently, some courts have acknowledged the validity of a theory
that intentional school acts can cause housing effects which cause fur-
203. Id at 1114.
204. Id
205. (1981) Equal Opp. in Housing (P-H) 15,404 (N.D. Ill.).
206. See notes 83-88, 145, 152, 156-57 and accompanying text supra.
207. Swam v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1971).
Justice Burger asserted that "people gravitate toward facilities .... [T]he location of
schools may thus influence the patterns of residential development of a metropolitan




ther school effects.2"8 This theory logically arises from the defense
asserted by school board officials in single district cases that demo-
graphic changes caused the school effects. 209 Litigants have ex-
panded it in attempts to prove interdistrict liability justifying a school
desegregation remedy.2" To date, however, no ligitants have suc-
cessfully proved the theory in an interdistrict case.21'
As in the previous hybird model derived from the pure housing
case, courts must resolve a number of problems resulting from the
merger of school and housing causes of action.212 The primary new
issue in the hybrid school model centers on the causal relationship
between school acts and housing effects. 213 In single district cases,
208. See, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. I (Denver), 413 U.S. 189, 202-03 (1973)
(earmarking schools according to racial composition may have a profound reciprocal
effect on racial residential composition within a metropolitan area, thereby causing
further racial concentration within the schools); Bradley v. Milliken (Detroit), 620
F.2d 1143, 1150 (6th Cir. 1980) (de lure school segregation contributed to segregated
residential patterns and existing one race schools in Detroit; it encouraged whites to
flee from racially changing neighborhoods and ultimately from the city school dis-
trict); United States v. Texas Educ. Agency (Lubbock), 600 F.2d 518, 525 (5th Cir.
1979) (if housing patterns that are based on neighborhood school assignment plan are
themselves the product of board's intentional acts, a constitutional infirmity exists).
209. See note 162 supra for cases where defendants raised the demographic de-
fense unsuccessfully. See also Bradley v. Milliken (Detroit), 620 F.2d at 1149-50 (seg-
regative effects of school defendants' discriminatory acts not obliterated by
demographic changes those policies helped produce; further remedy can be ordered);
United States v. Texas Educ. Agency (Lubbock), 600 F.2d at 527 (if intentional school
acts helped establish housing patterns, schools' resegregation is a violation despite
brief period of integration).
210. See notes 255-58 and accompanying text infra.
211. See, e.g., Andrews v. City of Monroe, 513 F. Supp. 375, 393 (W.D. La. 1980)
(court refused to qualify plaintiff's expert's testimony concerning residential effects of
school segregtion since she knew nothing about the metropolitan area), aft'dsub non.
Taylor v. Ouachita Parish School Bd., 648 F.2d 959 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Board of School Comm'rs (Indianapolis), 506 F. Supp. 657, 666 (S.D. Ind. 1979)
(court rejected plaintiff's sociological and psychological opinion testimony as being
without foundation), af'd in part, rev'd in part, 637 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 838 (1980).
212. See notes 167-99 and accompanying text supra concerning problems of in-
tent, causation, and significance of effects.
213. See, e.g., Taylor v. Ouachita Parish School Bd., 648 F.2d at 970 (court re-
fused to admit testimony that allowing city whites to transfer to another district
caused city schools and neighborhoods to become blacker); Bell v. Board of Educ.
(Akron), 491 F. Supp. 916,940 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (perception of school as black causes
whites not to settle in residential area served by that school; they will also avoid ele-
mentary attendance zones that serve black secondary school); Evans v. Buchanan
(Wilmington), 393 F. Supp. 428, 435-36 (D. Del.) (discriminatory optional transfer
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school defendants may have to disprove that causal relationship.2 14
In multidistrict cases, plaintiffs must prove causality2 15 and signifi-
cant interdistrict effects. 2
16
The principal purpose of this liability model is to obtain sys-
temwide or interdistrict school desegregation remedies,2" 7 although it
may also justify housing remedies.21 The following subsection will
analyze the problems unique to this model, illustrate the application
of this model in single district and interdistrict cases, and discuss the
scope of school remedies that plaintiffs may obtain.
A. Problems Encountered in the Hybrid School Model
In this model, courts may encounter most of the same problems
found in the hybrid housing model that result from the merger of
school and housing causes of action.219 Only standing presents no
difficulty because plaintiffs are alleging that school defendants inten-
tionally segregated schools, causing demographic shifts that pro-
duced more extensive school harm.2 0 Defendants are clearly
capable of remedying such school effects. The issue of intent is the
same as that presented in the pure school22 and hybrid housing
policy allowed whites to transfer elsewhere, leaving some neighborhood schools dis-
proportionately blacker, this may have encouraged white families to move out and
discouraged white families from moving in, thus affecting racial balance in housing
and schools in city suburbs), afdmem., 423 U.S. 963 (1975).
214. See United States v. Texas Educ. Agency (Lubbock), 600 F.2d at 527 (district
court must determine how much incremental segregative effect school board's inten-
tional acts had on residential distribution of present school population; board contin-
ues to bear burden to show its intentional acts did not contribute to current
segregation of certain schools). See notes 249-54 and accompanying test infra.
215. See notes 255-58 and accompanying text infra.
216. See Milliken v. Bradley (Detroit), 418 U.S. at 744-45 (must be shown that
discriminatory acts of one or more districts have been substantial cause of interdistrict
segregation).
217. Examples of cases where plaintiffs sought interdistrict school remedies based
upon the hybrid school theory are United States v. Board of School Comm'rs (Indian-
apolis), 637 F.2d at 111 I, and Andrews v. City of Monroe, 513 F. Supp. at 392-93.
For a single-district case, see United States v. Texas Educ. Agency (Lubbock), 600
F.2d at 520.
218. See, e.g., note 152 and accompanying text supra.
219. See notes 167-99 and accompanying text supra.
220. Since school officials are alleged to have caused the harm and can provide
the remedy, Warth standing requirements are satisfied. See discussion of standing in
notes 107-08, 141-42 and accompanying text supra.




models.2 22 This model may present unique burdens of showing cau-
sation and quantifying effects.
Theories of how school segregation causes residential segregation
are largely conjectural, based upon intuitive concepts that some
scholars and courts have attacked.223 Causal explorations originate
with the concept of "tipping". Some courts have observed that white
families will tolerate only a certain level of racial mixing.22 4 "White
222. See notes 189-95 and accompanying text supra.
223. See Austin Indep. School Dist. v. United States, 429 U.S. 990, 994 (1976)
vacating and remanding 532 F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 1976)) (Powell, J., concurring) (dis-
crimination in housing cannot be attributed to school authorities); note 159 supra. See
also United States v. Board of School Comm'rs (Indianapolis), 506 F. Supp. at 667
(cannot demonstrate that segregative acts by one board within its own boundaries
have any significant effect on school or residential population in adjoining districts;
rather it appears that school desegregation causes white flight); Wolf, supra note 1, at
66 (only way in which racial composition of a school could have a corresponding
effect upon racial composition of a neighborhood would be through an indirect causal
relationship; evidence is flimsy and unconvincing). But see Keyes v. School Dist. No.
I (Denver), 413 U.S. at 202-03 (common sense dictates that racially inspired school
board actions have an impact beyond the particular schools acted upon; a reciprocal
effect on racial composition of residential neighborhoods within metropolitan areas
may exist); Taeuber, supra note I, at 843. Professor Taeuber posits a "signalling"
theory of causation. When school board actions identify schools as black or white,
people make housing choices accordingly. The public receives a signal that school
authorities expect changing schools to become all-black. Whites tend to move away
from or avoid such schools. If schools could not be identified by race or black schools
were not considered inferior, then neighborhood school zones would have little effect
on real estate steering or residential choices. Id
224. See, e.g., Business Ass'n of University City v. Landrieu, 660 F.2d 867, 869,
875-76 (3d Cir. 1981) (HUD's finding that housing project had no significant impact
on minority concentration held not arbitrary or capricious); Otero v. New York City
Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122, 1133, 1137 (2d Cir. 1973) (court must consider housing
authority's defense that it took challenged actions to prevent neighborhood tipping);
Shannon v. United States Dep't of H.U.D. (Philadelphia), 436 F.2d 809, 821-22 (3d
Cir. 1970) (court required HUD to reconsider impact of subsidized housing project on
racial balance of neighborhood); King v. Harris (Staten Island), 464 F. Supp. 827,
837, 842-43 (E.D.N.Y.) (HUD has an affirmative duty to promote racial integration
through housing; therefore, proposed housing project enjoined because it would ra-
cially tip an integrated community), a 'd met. sub nont King v. Faymor Dav. Co.,
614 F.2d 1288 (2d Cir. 1979), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 446 U.S. 905
(1980); Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v. Romney (Manhattan), 387 F. Supp. 1044,
1063-75 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (plaintiffs failed to delineate critical ghetto area correctly or
prove that construction of public housing would tip the area), affid in part, rev'd in
part, and remanded, 523 F.2d 88 (2d Cir. 1975); Coffey v. Romney (Greensboro),
1971-75 Equal Opportunity in Housing (P-H) 13,588 (M.D.N.C. 1972) (HUD's find-
ing that subsidized housing project would not racially tip neighborhood not arbitrary
and capricious).
In Trinity Episcopal School Corp., the court defined the tipping point as "that point
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flight" occurs when percentages of minority families exceed that
level. 2 ' "Tipping" causes "racial identification." ' 6 Depending upon
their racial makeup, neighborhoods become identified as "white" or
"black." This identification influences private residential choices in
addition to government and private agency practices.227 Federal
courts have held government agencies liable for "tipping" neighbor-
hoods. For example, a court may find a agency liable if it assigns
minority tenants228 or constructs minority housing229 in racially inte-
grated neighborhoods already at the "tipping point."
Federal courts carried "tipping" and "racial identification" an ad-
ditional step, stating that racial identification of schools directly af-
fects perceptions of the surrounding neighborhoods. 230 Thus school
boards may racially identify schools and neighborhoods, affecting
at which a set of conditions has been created that will lead to the rapid flight of an
existing majority class under circumstances of instability which result in the deteriora-
tion of the neighborhood environment." 387 F. Supp. 1065-66. The court established
three criteria to determine whether the area had reached the tipping point: "(1) gross
numbers of minority group families likely to adversely affect area conditions; (2) ...
quality of community services and facilities; and (3) ...attitudes of majority group
residents who might be persuaded by their subjective reactions. . .". Id at 1066. See
generally HoUsING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, supra note I1, at 588-92;
Taeuber, Social and Demographic Trends: Focus on Race, in THE FUTURE OF ME-
TROPOLIS: PEOPLE, JOBS, INCOME (E. Ginzberg ed. 1975); Ackerman, Integration for
Subsidized Housing and the Question ofRacial Occupancy Controls, 26 STAN. L. REV.
245, 260 (1974).
225. Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v. Romney (Manhattan), 387 F. Supp. at
1065-66.
226. Cf. Coffey v. Romney (Greensboro), 13,588 at 13,870-71 (expert noted that
blacks and whites seeking housing and real estate brokers would perceive the neigh-
borhood as changing from predominantly white to predominantly black, affecting
their housing choices; but court refused to accept conclusions with respect to specific
project due to expert's lack of familiarity with the community). See generally Hous-
ING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, supra note 111, at 589-90.
227. See note 223 supra.
228. Otero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122, 1133, 1137 (2d Cir.
1973) (public housing authority satisfied its duty to integrate by refusal to assign mi-
nority tenants to project in neighborhood at tipping point).
229. King v. Harris (Staten Island), 464 F. Supp. at 837, 842-43 (housing project
enjoined because it would racially tip integrated community).
230. See, e.g., Adams v. United States (St. Louis), 620 F.2d 1277, 1291 (8th Cir.
1980) (public perception of the racial identity of a school can be, and often is, a pow-
erful factor shaping the residential patterns of a neighborhood); Evans v. Buchanan
(Wilmington), 393 F. Supp. at 437 (demographer testified that specific school zone is
part of the identification of neighborhoods that the general public and real estate




residential choices and even causing white flight.2 3 As more whites
flee to primarily white neighborhoods and realtors steer more fami-
lies into racially identified neighborhoods, the effects spread to fringe
neighborhoods, affecting more housing and schools. 32 Thus, origi-
nal intentional school segregation may have a perhaps unintended
ripple effect on neighborhoods and schools.233
School plaintiffs may find it extremely difficult to demonstrate a
significant causal relationship between residential choice and school
segregation.234 It is not an easy task to statistically determine why
families chose to reside in certain neighborhoods. Proving why fami-
lies chose not to reside in certain neighborhoods, however, poses an
even more difficult problem. If hostility to racially identified neigh-
borhoods or schools was the reason for residential choice, many fami-
lies presumably would not admit it. Some families may have been
totally unaware that they were victims of racial steering. Further,
housing opportunities may have dictated residential choices. As indi-
cated in Evans, some government programs encouraged racial steer-
ing and provided low interest loans to support the white exodus from
the inner cities.235 Other government programs selected sites for low
income minority housing in racially impacted areas.2 36 Thus the un-
231. See, e.g., Bradley v. Milliken (Detroit), 620 F.2d at 1149 (discriminatory pol-
icies of school defendants helped to drive white population from Detroit school dis-
trict and to contain black students in core of city); Evans v. Buchanan (Wilmington),
393 F. Supp. at 435-36 (discriminatory transfer option increasing minority concentra-
tions in neighborhood schools may have encouraged white families to move out and
discouraged whites from moving in).
232. See generally Orfield, supra note 1, at 22. Dr. Orfield explained there is a
common expectation that a neighborhood beginning substantial integration will inev-
itably become a ghetto. Consequently, realtors show homes to black homebuyers in
such areas, but steer white homebuyers elsewhere, speeding up the process of change.
Neighborhood school policy augments this transition and helps to make the expecta-
tion a self-fulfilling prophecy. Id
233. See, e.g., United States v. Texas Educ. Agency (Lubbock), 600 F.2d at 529 (if
board's intentional acts inadvertently contributed, through housing effects, to segrega-
tion of schools surrounding old dejure minority schools, a constitutional violation
exists),
234. In Lubbock, the Fifth Circuit instructed the district court to determine how
much "incremental segregative effect" the school board's intentional discriminatory
acts had on the residential distribution of the present school population, compared to
what it would have been but for those acts. 600 F.2d at 527.
235. 393 F. Supp. at 434 (FHA mortgage underwriting manual, in use until 1949,
advocated racially homogeneous neighborhoods; realtor code of ethnics advocating
racial discrimination not eliminated from state publication until 1970).
236. Id at 435.
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derlying discriminatory causes of private housing choices may not be
readily apparent even to the families themselves.
The impact of segregated schools on residential choices is even
more difficult to quantify. Professor Karl Taueber has conducted
studies that demonstrate a high correlation between segregated
schools and segregated housing.23 He utilized general statistical
findings to assert that segregated schools have a "signalling" effect
that racially identifies neighborhoods, causing further school segrega-
tion.238 Yet several courts have rejected expert testimony based on
this theory without a sufficient showing of concrete local statistics.239
Presumably, courts would require plaintiffs to provide the following
evidence to prove causality: first, plaintiffs must present evidence
237. K. TAEUiER & A. TAEUBER, NEGROES IN CITIES 29, 34 (1965) (index of
dissimilarity measures the degree of residential segregation in major cities). See also
Taeuber, supra note 1, at 834.
238. Taeuber, supra note 1, at 843. See note 223 supra.
239. In Taylor v. Ouachita Parish School Bd., 648 F.2d at 970 (affirming Andrews
v. City of Monroe, 513 F. Supp. 375 (W.D. La. 1980)), the government's expert sought
to show that where city whites were allowed to transfer to another district, minority
concentrations in city schools and neighborhoods increased. Id. The district court,
however, refused to allow the expert's testimony since she knew nothing about the
metropolitan area. She had spent only one day in the area. 513 F. Supp. at 393. The
Fifth Circuit asserted such testimony would have been irrelevant since the interdis-
trict transfer was not, in its view, an interdistrict violation. Had it been, the court
acknowledged that testimony about the transfer options' effects on residential patterns
would be important. 648 F.2d at 971 & n.13.
In Indianapolis, the district court viewed plaintiffs' theory that city school acts
caused housing effects with further interdistrict school effects as illogical and wrong.
The court rejected plaintiffs' sociological and psychological opinion testimony since it
did not relate to the statistical evidence. Even assuming that many whites do not
want their children to go to school with blacks, the court reasoned that segregated city
schools would more likely keep whites from fleeing, since many whites could continue
to reside near all-white schools. Conversely, the court pointed to statistics that
showed the threat of desegregation stimulated white flight from the city. Addition-
ally, the later threat of county-wide desegregation appeared to contribute to white
flight to outer, unaffected suburbs. 506 F. Supp. at 666-67.
In Bell v. Board of Educ. (Akron), 491 F. Supp. at 940, plaintiffs also failed to
persuade the court to accept the signalling theory. See note 223 supra. The court's
expert, Dr. Taeuber, gave his opinion as a sociologist and demographer that schools
are an important factor in private housing decisions. He did not, however, detail any
concrete facts in support. Another expert presented a study of West Akron residents
that showed they were thinking about moving away or taking children out of public
schools because of dissatisfaction with area schools. The court concluded there was
no evidence to show people actually moved because of the schools. Another expert
testified that schools are only a marginal factor in housing decisions. Following the




that intentional school board acts caused segregation in the schools.
Second, plaintiffs must quantify their segregative effects within the
schools. Third, plaintiffs must demonstrate and quantify residential
population shifts during the same periods. Fourth, plaintiffs must
demonstrate that the distribution of the black residential population
did not generally conform to their expected distribution by income
and household characteristics.2' This showing would raise the ques-
tion of why blacks were unevenly distributed. Finally, plaintiffs must
demonstrate a high statistical correlation between segregation in the
schools and residential segregation.24' This will strongly support the
case that "but for" discriminatory school acts, segregated housing
and, in turn, further segregated schools would not have occurred.
The fourth step poses the greatest problem. However, a study
presented in Parma provides a guide for such an analysis. In Parma,
defendants presented non-discriminatory rationales for segregated
residential patterns. They alleged that blacks, like other ethnic
groups, preferred to live together,242 moving along "ethnic corridors"
to certain communities.24 Further, defendants stated that for eco-
nomic reasons blacks could not afford housing in certain communi-
ties. 2' The judge, however, accepted statistical evidence that belied
defendants assertions.245 Contrary to the distribution of other ethnic
groups, distribution of the black population in Parma and throughout
the county did not generally conform to their expected distribution
by income and household characteristics.246 Despite alleged "associ-
ational preferences",247 all ethnic groups except blacks had dispersed
throughout the county.24 Consequently, defendants failed to justify
exclusionary zoning practices with segregative impacts on excluded
minority plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs in Parma utilized the evidence to establish municipal
240. Cf. United States v. Parma, 494 F. Supp. at 1062-65. See notes 242-48 and
accompanying text infra.
241. See, e.g., K. TAEUBER & A. TAEUBER, supra note 237, at 29; Taeuber, supra
note 1, at 834.
242. 494 F. Supp. at 1059-60.
243. Id at 1060.
244. Id at 1062-65.
245. Id
246. Id at 1064-65.
247. Id at 1059-62.
248. Id at 1062-65.
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liability for housing discrimination. Conceivably, plaintiffs may em-
ploy the same method to demonstrate the causal relationship between
school acts and housing and school effects. Further, it provides a
means for quantifying the significance of the effect in an interdistrict
case. Consequently, plaintiffs may utilize expert sociological testi-
mony supported by concrete local statistical evidence. The next sub-
section will discuss how such evidence may be applied in single
district and interdistrict school cases.
B. Applications of the Model
1. Single District Application
A recent case illustrates how this liability theory may work success-
fully in a single district. In United States v. Texas Education Agency
(Lubbock),2 4 the government proved intentional school board dis-
crimination in seven schools. Based on this showing, the court ap-
plied the presumption of systemwide liability to all the segregated
minority schools.250 The district court held, however, that the board
successfully rebutted the presumption as to certain minority schools.
The board proved that shifting housing patterns, not produced by
board acts directed at those schools, had caused their segregation. 5t
The Fifth Circuit observed that the lower court's analysis failed to
address whether the original segregative acts affected shifts in racial
housing patterns that resegregated schools formerly integrated.25 2
249. 600 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1979).
250. Id at 524. See notes 38-39 and accompanying text supra for a discussion of
the Keyes presumption.
251. 600 F.2d at 524. Twenty-two schools had minority population exceeding
70%. Id at 521. Of these, the district court held that the school board had success-
fully rebutted the Keyes presumption as to 13 schools. Id at 524. The district court's
analysis viewed each school as an island. Id at 525. The court had only examined,
first, whether the school in question had been fully integrated, and second, whether
the board took any direct action to cause resegregation in that school. Id at 524.
252. Id at 524. The court asserted that a constitutional violation would exist if
the housing patterns upon which racially neutral neighborhood zones are based were
themselves the product of the board's intentional acts of discrimination. Id at 525. It
noted that the Supreme Court had never explicitly addressed the question of whether
unintended effects of intentionally segregative acts could form the basis of a constitu-
tional violation. The court outlined three possible effects of intentionally discrimina-
tory acts that could be considered fourteenth amendment violations: only intended
effects, only foreseeable effects, or any segregative effect. The court chose the latter,
reasoning that a strict definition of intent should only apply where harsh punishment




Essentially, the court presumed that any demographic changes that
caused segregation elsewhere in the district resulted from these origi-
nal board acts.253 Thus, defendants would have to prove that the
demographic shifts in no way, even inadvertently, resulted from their
intentional school violations. If courts adopt the Lubbock test, it
would render the presumption of systemwide liability nearly
irrebuttable 4
2. Interdistrict Application
Three courts255 have acknowledged the validity of the theory that
single district school segregation could cause extradistrict residential
segregation with significant extradistrict school effects. In Indianapo-
lis, for example, plaintiffs alleged that intentional systemwide segre-
goal is to restore the victims of discrimination to the position they would have occu-
pied but for the conduct. Id at 527.
253. Id at 527-28. The court's language can be read as setting up this presump-
tion. It instructed the lower court to make specific findings concerning the effects, if
any, of the intentional discriminatory acts on Lubbock housing patterns. The court
then stated, "On remand, the school board continues to bear the burden to show its
intentional segregative acts did not contribute to the current segregation of those
schools." Id But see Note, The Segregative Iapact of Changing Demographics Upon
School Districts Subject to Court- Ordered Desegregation, 49 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 100
(1980). The author states that the court in Lubbock did not apply a presumption that
the school authorities were responsible for resegregation, id at 119, but argues that
courts should apply such a presumption. Id at 102.
254. See Lee v. Macon County, 616 F.2d 805, 810 (5th Cir. 1980) (not until all
vestiges of dual system are eradicated can demographic changes constitute legal cause
for racial imbalance in schools); Tasby v. Wright (Dallas), 520 F. Supp. 683, 704
(N.D. Texas 1981) (Keyes presumption may be irrebuttable; demographic changes are
insufficient to rebut); Symposium, CivilfRihts, 12 TEx. TECH. L. REV. 139, 155 (1981)
(school board's proof that existence of one-race school attributable to residential pat-
terns no longer aper se rebuttal of Keyes presumption).
Where, however, plaintiffs attempt initially to use the hybrid school theory, without
the aid of the Keyes presumption, they face a difficult burden of proof. See, e.g., Bell
v. Board of Educ. (Akron), 491 F. Supp. at 940 (plaintiffs failed to prove signalling
theory). See also notes 223, 239 supra.
255. United States v. Board of School Comm'rs (Indianapolis), 637 F.2d at 1111-
12 (theory that intradistrict school segregation caused interdistrict housing and school
effects not implausible); Andrews v. City of Monroe, 513 F. Supp. at 392 (if inten-
tional segregative acts of local school officials helped establish the residential patterns
of a metropolitan area, then the segregated status of the schools violates the Constitu-
tion); Bradley v. Milliken (Detroit), 460 F. Supp. 299, 307-08 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (rec-
ord did not show that de jure acts in city had segregative effects beyond boundaries;
had record shown that such acts created additional residential segregation which in
turn created additional school segregation, court assumed that Supreme Court would
have allowed interdistrict remedy), aj7'd, 630 F.2d 1143 (6th Cir. 1980).
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gation in one or more school districts reinforced the racial
identification of the schools.256 This racial identification affected per-
ceptions of the racial character of surrounding neighborhoods, influ-
encing private housing choices and resulting in white flight to the
suburbs. Consequently, these segregative residential effects extended
across school district lines with significant effects on surrounding
school districts.25 Although the court accepted the rationale
presented by plaintiffs as plausible it did not disturb the lower court's
conclusion that plaintiffs failed to present sufficient statistical support
to warrant an interdistrict remedy.2
8
In sum, although courts have considered this chain of causation,
the burden of proof is so difficult that the bearer will rarely prevail.
In single district cases, where the presumption aids plaintiffs they
have an excellent chance to succeed. Yet plaintiffs will not succeed in
interdistrict cases unless they develop methods of proof acceptable to
the courts. The next subsection will briefly discuss remedies that
plaintiffs may obtain when they satisfy the evidentiary requirements
of this theory of liability.
C. Scope of Remedies
Plaintiffs have principally sought to obtain systemwide or interdis-
trict school remedies through the use of this model.2" 9 However,
under some circumstances housing remedies may be justified. In the
single district case, plaintiffs need only establish aprimafacie school
case that the defendant school board intentionally segregated a
meaningful portion of the school district. Where defendants fail to
rebut the presumption of systemwide liability, plaintiffs will not have
proved any housing violations.260 Consequently, courts could only
256. United States v. Board of School Comm'rs (Indianapolis), 637 F.2d at 1111.
257. Id
258. Id Since plaintiffs' experts did not ground their theory on any of the statisti-
cal evidence in the case, the court rejected the theory. The court thought the statistics
showed that the threat of desegregation, rather than the fact of segregated city
schools, increased white flight from the city. Statistics also indicated that the possibil-
ity of county-wide desegregation contributed to white flight to outer, unaffected sub-
urbs. 506 F. Supp. at 666-67.
259. United States v. Board of School Comm'rs (Indianapolis), 637 F.2d at 1111
(only interdistrict school remedy sought); United States v. Texas Educ. Agency (Lub-
bock), 600 F.2d at 520 (only single-district school remedy sought); Andrews v. City of
Monroe, 512 F. Supp. at 392-93 (only interdistrict school remedy sought).




order a systemwide school remedy. In interdistrict cases plaintiffs
will necessarily have to prove the residential and school effects of
intentional school violations. 6 1 Such a showing will justify an in-
terdistrict school desegregation remedy2 62 and possibly a housing
remedy2 63 . However, the question remains whether courts may re-
quire non liable government housing actors to remedy the housing
effects of private residential choices. This issue will be addressed in
the next model.
D. Summary of the Hybrid School Model
This theory is based on intuitive notions, subject to dispute, that
families consider the racial makeup of schools in formulating their
residential decisions. To date, plaintiffs have failed to prove the
causal relationship between intentional school segregation and subse-
quent residential segregation. The model best serves plaintiffs in the
single district case who have already demonstrated that defendants
segregated a "meaningful portion" of the school district. A court
may then presume that the original school segregation contributed to
residential and school segregation in the remainder of the district,
shifting a nearly impossible burden onto the defendants.
V. SCHOOL VIOLATIONS CAUSE HOUSING EFFECTS
Just as government housing actors rather than school boards may
be primarily responsible for causing segregated schools26', school
boards rather than government housing actors may have caused seg-
regated residential patterns. Thus, plaintiffs may be able to secure a
housing remedy by proving intentional school violations. 265 To date,
segregation caused by their intentional acts in a significant portion. See notes 36-40,
253-54 and accompanying text supra.
261. See notes 237-41 and accompanying text supra.
262. See notes 83-88 and accompanying text supra.
263. See notes 133, 152 and accompanying text supra.
264. United States v. Board of School Comm'rs (Indianapolis), 637 F.2d 1101,
1111, 1114 (7th Cir. 1980); Evans v. Buchanan (Wilmington), 393 F. Supp. 428, 432-
36 (D. Del.), aft'dmetm, 423 U.S. 963 (1975). See notes 162-206 and accompanying
text supra.
265. This model primarily focuses on the demographic effects of school violations
largely resulting from private choice or racial steering, see notes 230-48 and accompa-
nying text supra, rather than housing acts of government officials. In the latter case, a
housing count may be brought directly against the housing officials. See notes 89-161
and accompanying text supra.
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however, courts have not considered the validity of this model.266 Ju-
dicial recognition of the causal relationship between school acts and
housing segregation,16  however, makes this model conceivable.
Moreover, recent use of housing remedies in school cases, both man-
dated268 and voluntary,269 may focus attention on the potential bene-
fits of seeking a housing remedy for the effects of intentional school
violations.
Although this second hybrid school model has a certain rationality,
it poses the same problems as the first hybrid school model in merg-
ing school and housing liability." Further, it presents a new issue of
whether courts can order government housing agencies to remedy
266. Litigants appear to have presented the district court with that opportunity in
Liddell v. Board of Educ. (St. Louis), 469 F. Supp. 1304 (E.D. Mo. 1979), Cross-
Claim of the Board of Education of the City of St. Louis (Jan. 9, 1981). See notes
327-30 and accompanying text infra.
267. See, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1 (Denver), 413 U.S. 189, 202 (1973)
(discriminatory school acts may earmark schools according to their racial composi-
tion; together with student assignment and school construction such acts may have a
"profound reciprocal effect on the racial composition of residential neighborhoods
within the metropolitan area"); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402
U.S. 1, 20-21 (1971) (location of schools may influence patterns of residential develop-
ment in a metropolitan area with an important impact on the composition of inner-
city neighborhoods); United States v. Board of School Comm'rs (Indianapolis), 637
F.2d at 1111-12 (court stated that expert's theory "not implausible" that dejure school
segregation racially identified certain areas within the county, and private housing
choices followed those "quasi-official" neighborhood designations); Bradley v. Milli-
ken (Detroit), 620 F.2d 1143, 1148-50 (6th Cir. 1980) (discriminatory school policies,
including school constructions and closings helped drive whites from the Detroit
school district and contain blacks in an ever-expanding core of the city); United States
v. Texas Educ. Agency (Lubbock), 600 F.2d 518, 525 (5th Cir. 1979) (school board's
discriminatory acts may produce segregated housing patterns); Penick v. Columbus
Bd. of Educ., 429 F. Supp. 229, 259 (S.D. Ohio 1977) (although school officials do not
control housing segregation their actions may have had a significant impact on hous-
ing patterns), afd and remanded, 583 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1978), aft'd, 443 U.S. 449
(1979); Reed v. Rhodes (Cleveland), 422 F. Supp. 708, 790 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (local
school board actively contributed to segregated nature of public housing projects by
agreeing to construct schools to service housing projects), remandedfor reconsidera-
lion, 559 F.2d 1220 (6th Cir. 1977); Evans v. Buchanan (Wilmington), 393 F. Supp. at
435-36 (school board's optional attendance zones created disproportionately larger
black population in transferee schools; presence of proportionately more black chil-
dren in the school than in the neighborhood may have encouraged whites to move
and discouraged whites from moving in).
268. United States v. Board of School Comm'rs (Indianapolis), 637 F.2d at 1117
(court enjoined further construction of public housing in city of Indianapolis).
269. See note 156 supra and notes 279-82 and accompanying text infra.




segregated residential effects that did not result from intentional gov-
ernment housing violations.27" ' The following subsection will analyze
the possible justifications for requiring government housing agencies
to participate in the remedy.
A. Justfifcations for Housing Remedies to School Violations
Cases suggest two possible methods for joining non-liable housing
actors in a school case, based on the residential effects of school viola-
tions. Courts may join government housing actors under principles
of equity or agency. In Milliken and Gautreaux the Supreme Court
noted that equitable principles, not limited to school violations, re-
quire courts to remedy the effects of constitutional violations.272 Indi-
anapolis applied that principle in the hybrid housing model,
requiring non-liable school boards to remedy the school effects of in-
tentional housing violations.273 Thus a court could extend this equi-
table principle to require non-liable housing officials to remedy the
housing effects of an intentional school violation.
Agency theories provide an alternative rationale for government
actor participation in the remedy. In Morrilton School District No. 32
v. United States,274 the Eighth Circuit held that courts could order
school districts to participate in the remedy as instrumentalities of the
state275 despite their lack of liability. An earlier case, Hart v. Commu-
nity School Board of Education (Brooklyn),27 6 held that intentional
school violations by one arm of the state justified the district court in
forcing other arms of the state to participate in the remedy.277 In
Evans, the court found that state housing violations justified requir-
271. See notes 272-78 and accompanying text infra.
272. Hills v. Gautreaux (Chicago), 425 U.S. 284, 294 n. 11 (1976), citing Milliken
v. Bradley (Detroit), 418 U.S. at 744. See note 125 and accompanying text supra.
273. 637 F.2d at 1114. See notes 202-04 and accompanying text supra.
274. 606 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1071 (1980).
275. Id at 228-29 (although two school districts not implicated in the constitu-
tional violation, they may be required to participate in remedying the state's
violation).
276. 383 F. Supp. 699 (E.D.N.Y.), modNed, 383 F. Supp. 769 (E.D.N.Y. 1974),
aff'd, 512 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975).
277. Id at 752-53 (because the state is liable for carrying out the decree of the
court to desegregate schools, it must use each of its arms, including the public housing
authority, to effectuate the decree), modeled, 383 F. Supp. at 775 (rigid housing decree
undesirable due to the "cooperative spirit" of various governmental officials and the
"complexity of the matter").
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ing non-liable local school boards to participate in remedying the
school effects.27 8 Arguably, the same agency rationale could require
state government housing agencies to remedy the effects of inten-
tional state school violations.
Once housing actors are joined, two recent cases involving volun-
tary and mandatory housing remedies suggest a range of remedies
that courts may consider. In Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board of
Education (Louisville)27 9 the court provided an incentive for neigh-
borhoods to residentially desegregate. The decree exempted from
busing students in neighborhoods that became naturally inte-
grated.2 80 Local government housing agencies voluntarily provided
Section 8 existing housing units to promote suburban integration.281
This successful effort in Louisville may encourage courts to utilize
housing resources to promote desegregation of housing and schools,
especially where plaintiffs prove segregated housing effects. 282 In In-
dianapolis, on the other hand, the court focused on the continuing
278. 393 F. Supp. at 438.
279. Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board of Educ. (Louisville), 489 F. 2d 925
(6th Cir. 1973) (reversed district court dismissal of plaintiffs' complaints), vacated and
remanded, 418 U.S. 918 (1974) (in light of Milliken v. Bradley), reinstated thon re-
moval, 510 F.2d 1358 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 931 (1975), afdsub norm.
Cunningham v. Grayson, 541 F.2d 538 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1074
(1977).
280. 541 F.2d at 540 & n.1. The district judge exempted from busing black and
white pupils attending elementary schools 12 to 40% black and secondary schools 12.5
to 35% black. Id at 540 n.1. The court noted that such exemptions are common in
desegregation plans and knew of no cases invalidating such exemptions. Id See, e.g.,
United States v. School Dist. of Omaha, 521 F.2d 530, 546-547 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 946 (1975); Clark v. Board of Educ. (Little Rock), 465 F.2d 1044 (8th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 923 (1973); Tasby v. Estes (Dallas), 412 F. Supp. 1192
(N.D. Tex. 1976), remanded, 572 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed sub nom.
Estes v. Metropolitan Branches of Dallas N.A.A.C.P., 444 U.S. 437 (1980).
281. See note 156 supra.
282. A Vanderbilt University policy institute recently completed a comprehensive
assessment of school desegregation strategies. The group recommended the following
measures to facilitate school desegregation through housing desegregation: (1) de-
sign school decrees so as to preserve integrated and racially changing neighborhoods;
(2) provide busing exemption incentives to encourage segregated neighborhoods to
desegregate; (3) give incentives to induce individuals to move into communities
predominantly of the other race; (4) create a school district office concerned with
eliminating housing discrimination; (5) persuade local housing agencies to use scat-
tered site housing; (6) include local and federal housing agencies as parties in school
desegregation cases. CENTER FOR EDUCATION AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT POLICY
INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY STUDIES, STRATEGIES Fop EFFECTIVE DESEOREOA-




harm of discriminatory public housing site selection practices. It en-
joined government housing agencies from constructing family public
housing where it would perpetuate segregated schooling in old Indi-
anapolis. 283 Such a remedy also provided an incentive to construct
housing where it would enhance school desegregation, by absolutely
limiting public housing construction to the primarily white suburbs.
B. Summary of the Second Hybrid School Model
The fifth model elevates the causal link between school segregation
and residential segregation to the level of a constitutional violation.
Whereas school plaintiffs in the past have sought only school reme-
dies, successful use of housing remedies in recent school cases may
redirect plaintiffs to seek housing remedies to reinforce school deseg-
regation efforts. Thus, when school actors cause segregative housing
effects, courts may remedy school and housing segregation partly
through government housing programs. They may prohibit segrega-
tive housing practices, require affirmative housing remedies, and sup-
port housing incentives as alternatives to busing.
VI. SUMMARY OF THE LIABILITY MODELS
Plaintiffs may utilize one or more of five liability models to obtain
their desired remedies in a school desegregation case. Due to the
separate evolution of school and housing desegregation law, each
model raises different obstacles for proving liability and provides dif-
ferent remedies. In each case, plaintiffs must decide whether they
want school desegregation remedies, housing remedies, or both. That
decision, in addition to evidence available, will determine which
models that plaintiffs should use.
To obtain a school desegregation remedy, plaintiffs may utilize the
pure school model, the hybrid school model, or the hybrid housing
model. In the pure school model, plaintiffs must prove that either a
school board or the state intentionally caused school desegregation.
In the hybrid school model, segregated housing patterns play a major
part: plaintiffs must prove that intentional school acts caused resi-
dential segregation, exacerbating school segregation. In the hybrid
housing model, plaintiffs must prove that government housing actors,
rather than school actors, intentionally caused segregated schools.
283. United States v. Board of School Comni'rs (Indianapolis), 637 F.2d at 1114.
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The traditional pure school model284 imposes stringent equal pro-
tection standards on plaintiffs. They must prove intent and quantify
the effects of school board acts. In the single district case, once plain-
tiffs prove intentional discrimination in a meaningful portion of the
district, plaintiffs are assisted by the presumption that defendants in-
tentionally segregated the entire school district. The burden on
plaintiffs is greater in an interdistrict case, because they often must
prove the effects of defendants' intentional violations are substantial
enough to warrant intruding on non-liable school boards. The gains,
however, are also great because courts generally order broad, intru-
sive remedies once they find defendants liable.
Plaintiffs' choice of the hybrid school model285 to obtain a school
remedy may depend on whether they seek a single district or interdis-
trict remedy. Under the Lubbock decision, plaintiffs are aided by the
presumption of systemwide liability. Once they prove that defendant
school boards intentionally segregated a meaningful portion of the
school district, the court will shift an almost impossible burden on
defendants to disprove the causal links between school acts, their
housing effects, and their ultimate school effects. To obtain an in-
terdistrict remedy, on the other hand, courts require that plaintiffs
prove those causal links. Plaintiffs must provide extremely strong
statistical evidence of the causal relationships to convince courts it
should provide an interdistrict remedy.
If plaintiffs have a weak case against school officials, they may
have to rely on the hybrid housing model,286 developing a case
against government housing entities to obtain a school desegregation
remedy. This is a difficult task for several reasons. First, plaintiffs
can not rely on the school effects of segregated housing patterns;
rather, they must identify a government housing actor that intention-
ally discriminated. Second, because courts are traditionally hesitant
to provide more than site-specific relief for discriminatory housing
acts, plaintiffs may have to prove a pattern and practice of discrimi-
nation justifying the more intrusive relief sought in school cases.
Third, plaintiffs must prove that those housing practices causes quan-
tiflably significant school effects. Thus courts may impose even
greater obstacles to proving liability justifying school remedies as
plaintiffs stray further from the pure school case. Yet plaintiffs may
284. See notes 18-88 and accompanying text supra.
285. See notes 207-63 and accompanying text supra.




have to meet those burdens if they lack a strong case against school
officials.
To obtain a housing remedy, plaintiffs may utilize the pure housing
model or the second hybrid school model. In the pure housing
model, plaintiffs must prove that housing actors either intentionally
caused residential segregation or they caused segregative housing ef-
fects without sufficient justification. When plaintiffs lack a case
against a government housing actor, they could argue the second hy-
brid school model. Under that model, plaintiffs must prove that
school officials' segregative acts caused residential segregation.
Plaintiffs using the pure housing model2 87 must usually argue their
case under the Fair Housing Act or Section 1982 due to the easier
liability standards of the statutes. The easier standards, however, tra-
ditionally afford only site-specific relief. Plaintiffs in a school case,
seeking comprehensive housing remedies to reinforce school desegre-
gation efforts, may find site-specific relief inadequate. Consequently,
they will have to satisfy more stringent equal protection standards
that often include standing problems. Alternatively, they may have
to prove a pattern and practice of discrimination warranting more
intrusive remedies. By satisfying those greater requirements, how-
ever, plaintiffs can take advantage of the broad metropolitan-wide
remedies within the authority of housing actors that Gautreaux
provides.
If plaintiffs want to obtain housing remedies but cannot prove lia-
bility against government housing officials, they may use the second
hybrid model to present a case against school officials. 88 However,
plaintiffs have the difficult task of proving that school acts caused
housing effects. This requires more than sociological theory; rather,
plaintiffs must present a statistically strong case. Further, plaintiffs
will have to identify a government housing actor capable of remedy-
ing school officials' discriminatory housing effects. As housing reme-
dies increase in importance within school desegregation cases, more
plaintiffs may assume these burdens of proof.
Finally, plaintiffs may choose to seek dual school and housing rem-
edies in a school desegregation case. This may be accomplished by
mixing any of the five liability models, depending upon the nature of
the evidence available. Whenever plaintiffs utilize the hybrid models
287. See notes 89-161 and accompanying text supra.
288. See notes 264-83 and accompanying text supra.
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of liability, their evidentiary burden will be more severe. The next
section will apply the five models to the factual allegations of a met-
ropolitan school desegregation case in St. Louis.
APPLICATION OF THE LIABILITY MODELS TO LIDDELL v
BOARD OF EDUCATION
The five liability models provide a conceptual framework for de-
termining liability and projecting the potential scope of remedies.
Liddell v. Board of Education (St. Louis)289 furnishes an opportunity
to apply the models to a metropolitan school desegregation case. The
Liddell complaints2 90 appear to represent all five models. Because
the case has not reached the stage of an interdistrict liability hearing,
the analysis must be confined to the complaints.
Consideration of Liddell is also important because it adds a new
dimension to the merger of school and housing case law. While Lid-
dell was still a single district school case, the district court ordered the
parties to recommend plans for affirmative housing activities that
would promote interdistrict school desegregation.2 9' Their compli-
ance, though minimal, may have forestalled complainants' efforts to
join government housing officials as defendants, thereby weakening
complainants' case for an interdistrict remedy.292
The following subsections will present the facts of the Liddell case,
apply the five liability models to the interdistrict complaints, analyze
the housing proposals, and discuss the impact of the judge's refusal to
join certain housing entities on complainants' case.
289. 469 F. Supp. 1304 (E.D. Mo. 1979), rev'd and remanded sub noma. Adams v.
United States, 620 F.2d 1277 (8th Cir.), 491 F. Supp. 351 (E.D. Mo.), cer. denied, 449
U.S. 826, 491 F. Supp. 351 (1980), aI'd, No. 80-1458, slip op. (8th Cir. Feb. 13, 1981),
cert. denied, 50 U.S. L.W. 3447 (U.S. Dec. 1, 1981).
290. Liddell v. Board of Educ. (St. Louis), 469 F. Supp. 1304 (E.D. Mo. 1979),
Motion of the Board for Leave to Amend Its Answer to Add a Cross Claim (Jan. 9,
1981) [hereinafter Board Complaint]; Caldwell Plaintiffs-Intervenors' Motion for
Leave to Add Additional Parties Defendant and to File Amended, Supplemental and
Cross Complaint (Jan. 16, 1981) [hereinafter Caldwell Complaint].
291. 491 F. Supp. at 354. The order and the resulting proposals represent the first
major effort to develop a comprehensive remedy relating school and housing plans.
Liddell v. Board of Educ. (St. Louis), 469 F. Supp. 1304 (E.D. Mo. 1979), The Hous-
ing Issues in the St. Louis Case (April 21, 1981) (court expert's report to Judge Wil-
liam L. Hungate) [hereinafter Housing Issues].




I. LIDDELL V BOARD OF EDUCATION
The metropolitan St. Louis area reflects segregated residential and
school patterns.293 The St. Louis City School District is coterminous
with the City of St. Louis. 294 Three counties in the metropolitan
area, including St. Louis County, contain over forty school dis-
tricts.295 Prior to Brown v. Board of Education,296 state law required
segregation of the schools by race. In response to Brown, the St.
Louis School Board adopted a neighborhood school plan.297 Since
that time, the exodus of white families from the City of St. Louis and
its schools has caused the racial composition of the schools to shift
from a sixty-five percent white majority to a seventy-six percent black
majority in 1979-80.29
In 1972, black school children and their parents brought suit
against the City of St. Louis Board of Education.29 9 The number of
parties grew. Plaintiffs included: the N.A.A.C.P., a white parent's
group, the United States, and the City of St. Louis.3 °0 Defendants
included: the State of Missouri, the Commissioner of Education, and
the State Board of Education.30'
The original suit was a pure school case in which plaintiffs alleged
that defendants failed to fulfill their affirmative duty to desegregate
293. P. Fischer, Racial Patterns in Housing and Schools: A Report on St. Louis,
4, 5 (July 17, 1980). One researcher concluded that racial concentrations intensified
within the city and northeastern St. Louis County in the last decade. Blacks made up
approximately 46% of the city by 1980. The entire north side is predominantly black.
Projected census figures indicate that the "white flight" which reduced St. Louis'
white population by half over the past twenty years, has now been joined by "black
flight." Blacks have been moving into St. Louis County in a process of ghetto spil-
lover and expansion. They now constitute 15% of the county population. Id
294. The City of St. Louis is also a county, separate and distinct from St. Louis
County.
295. See Board Complaint, supra note 290, at 2-3.
296, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
297. Adams v. United States (St. Louis), 620 F.2d at 1280.
298. Adams v. United States (St. Louis), 620 F.2d at 1285. Eighty-two percent of
the black students still attend schools that were 90% or more black. Three-fourths of
the schools were essentially one-race schools. Id
299. 620 F.2d at 1281.
300. 469 F. Supp. at 1312.
301. Id The court had earlier denied the defendant school board's motion to join
20 suburban school districts as defendants. Id at 1309.
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the city system after Brown.3"2 In response, the defendants denied
they had intentionally segregated the schools.3"3 Further, defendants
pointed to subsequent demographic shifts beyond their control as the
cause of current racial imbalance in the schools.3"
After the district judge ruled for the defendants,3"5 the Eighth Cir-
cuit reversed and remanded for remedy.306 The district court ap-
proved a school desegregation plan submitted by the school board.30 7
Following the appellate court's suggestion, the judge the parties to
302. Id at 1309. The court proceeded to trial on the issues of liability and remedy
simultaneously. 620 F.2d at 1283.
303. 620 F.2d at 1283.
304. See R. PATTON, RESOLVING THE DESEGREGATION ISSUE IN THE ST. Louis
PUBLIC SCHOOLS, PART II, at 12 (1979) (school board presented expert testimony to
show that federal, state, and local housing policies, and private real estate practices
caused the racial segregation of the schools).
305. 469 F. Supp. at 1360. The district court held the board's adoption of a neu-
tral neighborhood school plan effectively achieved a unitary system. He noted that
after St. Louis converted to a unitary school system, dramatic demographic changes
occurred. They involved a massive migration of whites from the city and an equally
massive intra-city migration of blacks. State laws and policies mandated housing seg-
regation prior to 1954. After 1954, discriminatory housing, urban renewal, and land
acquisition policies of the federal government contributed to these population shifts.
Private discriminatory policies such as redlining and separate newspaper listings for
"colored" housing were also instrumental. Id at 1319, 1323-24. The judge concluded
that the interaction of the neighborhood school policy with residential segregation
was the primary cause of racial imbalance and resegregation in the schools. He
viewed this as unforeseeable and beyond the control of the board. Id at 1362.
306. 620 F.2d at 1277. The Eighth Circuit held that the board's neighborhood
school plan did not meet its duty to dismantle the dual system. The court pointed out
that most schools in north St. Louis were black in 1954 and remained so in 1980. The
same was true of white south St. Louis schools. Id at 1291. The record indicated
that, without sacrificing the neighborhood concept, the board could have drawn
boundaries that would have provided more desegregation. Id at 1285 n. 11. Instead,
the board's steps, taken to avoid conflict, ensured that no significant desegregation
would occur. Id at 1284 n.8. It drew school attendance zones to relocate the smallest
possible number of students. Whenever possible, the board ensured that school staffs
retained their present assignments. "Preservation of the status quo, obviously meant
preservation of a segregated system." Id at 1287. Furthermore, numerous board
policies after 1956 preserved segregation: intact busing of whole classes, school site
selection, permissive transfers, and faculty assignments. Id at 1288. Having found
the board liable for perpetuating school segregation, the court turned to the question
of the appropriate remedy. It issued guidelines to be followed, including a coopera-
tive program exchanging students with suburban school districts and exemption from
busing for naturally integrated neighborhoods. Id at 1296.
307. 491 F. Supp. at 357. The plan contained several components. Among them
were clustering of schools, busing, magnet schools, faculty integration, and remedial




propose voluntary interdistrict school and housing remedies. He re-
quired party defendants and the United States to develop a voluntary
interdistrict pupil exchange with suburban school districts.30 Addi-
tionally, the judge ordered parties to suggest plans to insure that fed-
erally-assisted housing programs throughout the metropolitan area
would facilitate school desegregation.39 Finally, the desegregation
plan exempted from busing those neighborhoods that achieved cer-
tain levels of integration.3' Thus the judge approved incentives for
housing desegregation within the city while seeking voluntary metro-
politan remedies.
In the following year, plaintiffs and the defendant St. Louis Board
of Education petitioned to expand Liddell into a metropolitan-wide
school desegregation case, seeking to join numerous suburban school
districts, government housing actors, and other government units as
defendants.3 ' To date, the court has joined seventeen suburban
school districts, the state of Missouri, and the St. Louis County Gov-
ernment as defendants,312 staying the motion as to city, county, and
state housing authorities, in addition to suburban districts voluntarily
accepting black city students.3 ' The following subsection will re-
also found the state liable for failing to dismantle the dual system, and ordered it to
pay one-half the desegregation cost. Id at 353.
308. Id at 354. He also ordered development of a suggested plan of interdistrict
school desegregation necessary to eradicate remaining vestiges of governmental
school segregation in St. Louis city and county. Id
309. Id at 354.
310. See Housing Issues, supra note 291, at 6. The plan gave busing exemptions
in the first year to two neighborhoods that had 30 to 50% black enrollment and also to
one majority black school in a stable integrated neighborhood. New exemptions can
be granted to predominantly white neighborhoods that are more than 25% black for
at least two years as long as they are not changing too rapidly. Finally, the court will
not require busing of children from any majority white neighborhood school where
the all white neighborhood has accepted enough subsidized housing to produce a 20%
black enrollment. Id
311. See Board Complaint, supra note 290, at 1-3, and Caldwell Complaint, supra
note 290, at 1-3.
312. Liddell v. Board of Educ. (St. Louis), 469 F. Supp. 1304 (E.D. Mo. 1979),
No. H(337)8 1, Order at 5 (Aug. 24, 1981) (joining St. Louis County suburban school
districts and county government officials) [hereinafter Joinder].
313. Id at 3-4. The judge stayed the motion as to two outlying counties and their
school districts. He issued a stay, pending an evidentiary hearing, as to the Missouri
Housing Development Commission and St. Louis city and county housing and rede-
velopment agencies. Finally, he stayed the motion against those St. Louis County
school districts that agreed to participate in his proposed voluntary interdistrict plan.
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view the allegations of the interdistrict complainants in terms of the
five liability models.
II. APPLICATION OF THE MODELS TO COMPLAINANTS'
ALLEGATIONS IN THE INTERDISTRICT CASE
In order to fully develop a case that school and housing violations
justify the broadest possible remedy,314 complainants sought to join
numerous school and housing defendants. These included over forty
school districts in three counties. They also included as housing de-
fendants the City of St. Louis, St. Louis County and two other county
governments, the housing authorities of St. Louis City and County,
the land clearance agencies of St. Louis City and County, and the
Missouri Housing Development Corporation.315
The complaints noted two primary sources of liability that, linked
together, created and maintained racially segregated interdistrict
public education before and after Brown. Plaintiffs alleged statutory
school segregation prior to 1954, and continuous discriminatory
school acts until the present.3" 6 Secondly, they alleged discrimina-
tory zoning laws, racially restrictive covenants, discriminatory public
housing policies, other government actions prior to 1954, and contin-
ued discriminatory housing activities since then.31 From these two
sources, plaintiffs derived patterns of liability that may be categorized
under the five liability models.
Id To date, the court has stayed motions against eight school districts that have
voluntarily participated. St. Louis Post Dispatch, May 29, 1982, at IA, col. 2.
314. The Board Complaint seeks to enjoin all defendants, including housing de-
fendants, from further discriminatory policies. It also requests a metropolitan school
remedy that would consolidate districts, establish magnet schools, provide compensa-
tory programs, and desegregate faculties. Board Complaint, supra note 290, at 32. In
addition, the Caldwell complaint seeks affirmative housing desegregation. Caldwell
Complaint, supra note 290, at 21.
315. Caldwell Complaint, supra note 290, at 2-3; Board Complaint, supra note
290, at 2-3.
316. Caldwell Complaint, supra note 290, at 4-5; Board Complaint, supra note
290, at 4-5. Prior to 1954, Missouri law mandated racial segregation of schools, and
authorized the interdistrict transfer of black students to ensure that all schools were
segregated. The complaints allege that after 1954 the school defendants failed to
discharge their constitutional duty to dismantle the dual metropolitan system. Cald-
well Complaint, supra note 290, at 4-5; Board Complaint, supra note 290, at 4-5.




A. Pure School Case
The complainants alleged that local school boards caused extradis-
trict effects through a variety of acts and omissions. Segregative acts
included interdistrict transfers of minority students to designated mi-
nority schools31 8 and local acceptance of white transfer students from
predominantly black districts.3 9 The omissions included refusals to
consolidate or to enter cooperative student transfer agreements with
other districts.32°
The complaints also charged the state with direct and indirect lia-
bility for interdistrict school segregation. They charged the state with
failure to dismantle dual systems after Brown and perpetuation of
segregation through financial assistance, planning, and discrimina-
tory policies.321 Specifically, the state legislature had rejected in-
tegrative school consolidation proposals322 and fiscal incentives for
323voluntary desegregation. In addition, complainants argued the
state was liable for the segregative activities of its agents, the local
school boards.3 24
The school complaints thus represent a traditional set of interdis-
trict allegations325 that, if proven, would justify participation of non-
liable school districts where significant effects occurred.32 6
318. Caldwell Complaint, supra note 290, at 13; Board Complaint, supra note 290,
at 16.
319. Board Complaint, supra note 290, at 21.
320. Id at 23.
321. Id at 13.
322. Id at 23-25. In 1967, the state legislature established a Missouri School Dis-
trict Reorganization Commission (Spainhower Commission). In 1968, this commis-
sion recommended division of the state into 20 regional districts. The St. Louis region
would have divided the city district among four of 16 local subdistricts. The state
board of education and local districts did not support the plan. The legislature con-
sidered the proposal but did not approve it. Additionally, the allegations charge the
state and local school defendants with rejection of other consolidation proposals that
would have had desegregative effects. Id Moreover, the allegations charged the state
with using its laws to prevent or hinder desegregative consolidations. Specifically, the
maintenance of the St. Louis school district as a "metropolitan school district" effec-
tively prevented its consolidation with adjoining school districts. Id at 26.
323. Id at 23.
324. Id at 13.
325. See notes 67-72 and accompanying text supra.
326. See notes 62-82 and accompanying text supra.
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B. School Violations Cause Housing Effects
Complainants alleged that local school officials directly and indi-
rectly caused significant extradistrict housing effects. Some districts
allegedly opposed zoning changes and construction of low to moder-
ate income housing.327 Further, all of the intentionally segregative
school acts had racially identified schools and surrounding communi-
ties, contributing to residential segregation throughout the metropoli-
tan area.328 The complaints extended indirect liability to the state as
well for supporting school segregation that racially identified sur-
rounding communities. 329 By proving these allegations, complain-
ants conceivably could obtain remedies by government housing
officials even if courts did not find them liable for intentional
segregation.33°
C. School Violations Cause Housing Effects That
Cause School Effects
Complainants stated that school officials opposed zoning changes
and construction of low to moderate income housing with the intent
and effect of perpetuating segregated schools. 3 3 1 These allegations,
combined with the alleged residential effects of intentional school vi-
olations, reinforce complainants' case for an interdistrict school de-
segregation remedy.
D. Pure Housing Case
Complainants alleged that housing officials before and after Brown
pursued segregative practices that restricted or displaced blacks to
certain geographic areas, perpetuating residential segregation.332
These acts included discriminatory public housing site-selection 333
327. Board Complaint, supra note 290, at 27.
328. Id at 30.
329. Id at 30 (state's maintenance of dual metropolitan school structure contrib-
uted to residential segregation by identifying certain geographic areas as black and
others as white.).
330. See note 84 and accompanying text supra.
331. Board Complaint, supra note 290, at 27.
332. Id at 19.
333. Id The complaint alleged that prior to 1954, housing officials sited all con-
ventional public housing in black city neighborhoods, to be occupied exclusively by




and segregative use of other subsidized housing programs.334 The
complaints charged that urban renewal had disproportionately dislo-
cated blacks.335 Acts of omission included failure to use subsidized
housing to promote integration336 and failure to rezone land to en-
courage development of low income and multi-family housing.33
7
Government entities had also failed to enforce fair housing laws, 3 38
prohibit racial steering practices,339 or prohibit redlining by lending
institutions.34°
If proved, the complaints would directly implicate government
housing entities in residential discrimination that reinforced segre-
gated school patterns thereby justifying extensive housing remedies
as well as a school remedy.341
E. Housing Violations Cause School Effects
Complainants alleged that all the intentional housing violations
helped create and perpetuate segregated schools throughout the met-
ropolitan area.342 In addition, certain governmental acts at the state
and local level prior to Brown had continuing segregative effects on
the schools. These included discriminatory zoning laws,343 enforce-
ment of restrictive covenants, 344 and other discriminatory housing
policies. 345 If proved, they would justify housing346 and school reme-
dies 347 where the effects occurred.
building almost all conventional public housing in or adjacent to black residential
areas. Those units were almost exclusively black-occupied. Id at 28.
334. Id at 28.
335. Id at 29. The complaint alleged that demolition of dwellings in black areas,
without provision of appropriate housing for those displaced, caused the dislocation
of black residents into predominantly black neighborhoods. Id
336. Id at 29.
337. Id
338. Id at 30.
339. Id
340. Id
341. See notes 155-61 and accompanying text supra.
342. Board Complaint, supra note 290, at 14.
343. Id at 18.
344. Id
345. Id at 19.
346. See notes 202-06 and accompanying text supra.
347. See notes 62-82 and accompanying text supra.
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F. Summary of the Liddell Allegations
In sum, complainants have alleged a series of violations stemming
from intentionally discriminatory school and housing acts by federal,
state, and local officials with continuing interdistrict school and hous-
ing effects. These comprehensive allegations, if proved, would justify
broad school and housing remedies.34 These could be obtained
through the variety of approaches represented in the liability models.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE HOUSING PROPOSALS
When the district court ordered the state and the St. Louis School
Board defendants to develop housing proposals in cooperation with
HUD and the City of St. Louis Community Development Agency,
only the state refused to cooperate.349 The parties' cooperation in the
proposals may have forestalled joinder of HUD, the city and the
housing agencies as defendants.350 Although their proposals include
new, affirmative housing remedies, they fail to recommend the severe
restrictions ordered in Indianapolis.
The participants proposed measures that would reduce the segre-
gative impact of public housing on the schools, while providing some
housing incentives to promote integration. HUD agreed to reject
housing proposals likely to resegregate stable integrated neighbor-
hoods exempt from housing.351 The housing agencies also proposed
to refer all public housing proposals to the school board for comment
348. See notes 73-82, 146-161 and accompanying text supra.
349. The parties filed two separate housing plans, containing generally similar
proposals. See Liddell v. Board of Educ. (St. Louis), 469 F. Supp. 1304 (E.D. Mo.
1979), Plan Submitted Pursuant to Paragraph 12(d) of this Court's Order of May 21,
1980 (Dec. 8, 1980) [hereinafter HUD Plan]; Liddell v. Board of Educ. (St. Louis), 469
F. Supp. 1304 (E.D. Mo. 1979), Plan submitted by the Board of Education of the City
of St. Louis in conjunction with the Community Development Agency of the City of
St. Louis under Paragraph 12(d) of this Court's Order of May 21, 1980, at 14 (Dec. 15,
1980) [hereinafter School Board Plan]. The state defendants chose to refrain from
participation even after a reminder by the court. Id at 1-2.
350. The district court stayed, pending an evidentiary hearing, the motion to join
as defendants the Missouri Housing Development Commission, the Housing Author-
ity of St. Louis, and the Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority of St. Louis
County. Joinder, supra note 312, at 5. The judge had also stayed the motion against
those few school districts willing to participate in his voluntary metropolitan school
desegregation plan. Liddell v. Board of Educ. (St. Louis), 469 F. Supp. 1304 (E.D.
Mo. 1979), No. H(336)81, Order at 1-2 (Aug. 24, 1981).




on their potential segregative impacts on the schools.3 52 The City of
St. Louis committed to giving priority to scattered-site housing pro-
posals to further neighborhood and, consequently, school desegrega-
tion. 53 Further, HUD and the Department of Justice agreed to
coordinate interagency civil rights enforcement 354 and impose sanc-
tions on non-complying federal grant recipients.355 HUD also prom-
ised to intensify affirmative marketing enforcement.356 Thus the
principal benefits of the proposals include increased communication
between school and housing agencies and some attempts to disperse
housing opportunities for low income blacks.
Although the proposed measures would give priority to housing
proposals that promote school desegregation,357 they do not incorpo-
rate the measures ordered in Indianapolis. There the court prohibited
any further construction of family public housing other than in pri-
marily white residential areas.358 The Liddell housing proposals rec-
ommend that only a percentage of public housing and Section 8
subsidies be used to promote residential desegregation. 359 Thus, as
the court's expert observed, the housing plans may reduce the risk of
government housing programs damaging school integration.36 The
plans, however, guarantee little positive action.361  Even so, if ap-
352. HUD Plan, supra note 349, at 4, 14. HUD promised to use such comments
to rank housing proposals. Id School Board Plan, supra note 349, at 5.
353. School Board Plan, supra note 349, at 35.
354. HUD Plan, supra note 349, at 5.
355. Id at 4.
356. Id at 8.
357. For example, the HUD plan would give priority ranking to housing propos-
als that would help neighborhoods achieve the integration level required for a busing
exemption. Also, HUD promised to use § 8 subsidies to assist minority families in
moving out of ghetto areas. Id at 15-16.
358. United States v. Board of School Comm'rs (Indianapolis), 419 F. Supp. 180,
186 (S.D. Ind. 1975), aI'd, 541 F.2d 1211, 1223 (7th Cir. 1976), vacated andremanded
merm sub nor. Board of School Comm'rs v. Buckley, 429 U.S. 1068 (1977).
359. HUD said it would not approve proposals for assisted family housing that
would place more than 50% of units in any one year in racially-impacted areas. HUD
Plan supra note 349, at 6. Although HUD desired a net increase of minority children
living outside such areas, id at 7, it noted its obligation to help minority communities
rehabilitate their neighborhoods. Id at 3.
360. Housing Issues, supra note 291, at 129.
361. Id at 130. Dr. Orfield, the court's expert, observed that the commitments in
the plans were primarily negative or passive, although the plans did embrace impor-
tant goals. The parties however, gave no firm commitment to any significant expendi-
ture, nor any guarantee that they would construct or otherwise subsidize housing
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proved by the court, these proposals would become the first affirma-
tive housing remedy ordered in a school case.
IV. EFFECTS OF OMITTING HOUSING ACTORS AS PARTIES
By complying with the court's request to submit voluntary housing
proposals, the housing participants may have delayed, at least tempo-
rarily, their inclusion as defendants in the school desegregation
suit.362 As a consequence, the only government housing actors pres-
ently joined as defendants are the state and the St. Louis County
Government.363 The absence of some of the housing defendants may
weaken the claimants' case for interdistrict housing liability and re-
duce the possibility for interdistrict school and housing remedies.
The pure school case and the two derivative school models remain
virtually intact. In contrast, the housing case and the derivative alle-
gation that housing violations caused school effects may be weakened
in two ways. First, the court can not order housing remedies against
units to increase integration. Id He outlined what a potentially successful plan
would entail: (1) a counseling and marketing center to inform black families about
integrated housing opportunities; (2) an Areawide Housing Opportunity Plan
(AHOP) designed by the regional planning commission, a state agency, or HUD it-
self, if necessary, to obtain additional federal funding; (3) intensified Fair Housing
enforcement; (4) increased rent ceilings outside ghetto areas; (5) longer rent-up peri-
ods for new projects to aid affirmative marketing for integration; and (6) exploration
of additional low-interest funding through the Government National Mortgage Asso-
ciation to aid private developers of subsidized rental housing. Id at 131-37. Finally,
he recommended further actions to promote naturally integrated neighborhoods and
integrated schools without busing: a temporary freeze on federally-assisted construc-
tion or rehabilitation of housing in predominantly black school attendance areas; con-
ditions on Community Development Block Grants requiring that each recipient
support a housing desegregation order; encouragement to black families to move out
of ghetto areas provided through counseling and use of the Section 8 existing pro-
gram; coordinated housing and jobs counseling; and use of scattered site housing
units in white south St. Louis. Id at 141-146. Dr. Orfield recognized these actions
would require the joining of additional defendants and additional hearings and find-
ings of liability. Id at 139.
362. See note 350 and accompanying text supra.
363. Joinder, supra note 312, at 3, 5. The court on its own motion named the St.
Louis County Executive, Treasurer, and Collector as defendants. Id A year earlier,
the district court had denied the Caldwell plaintiffs' motion to make HUD a defend-
ant because the Justice Department was a plaintiff-intervenor. Liddell v. Board of
Educ. (St. Louis), 469 F. Supp. 1304 (E.D. Mo. 1979), No. 72-1OOC(4) (June 27, 1980).
Neither plaintiff sought to include HUD as a defendant in the interdistrict suit.





parties not before the court.36 4 Secondly, the judge may not be will-
ing to accept evidence against the housing parties kept out of the
case. The judge may be particularly hesitant when such parties have
voluntarily complied with his court order.
Consequently, the presence of all housing defendants sought by
claimants may be a necessary predicate to a finding that their inten-
tional acts caused interdistrict school segregation that warrants a
school remedy. On the other hand, the presence of the State of Mis-
souri and St. Louis County Government as defendants might allow
plaintiffs to introduce evidence against housing agencies under their
control.
V. SUMMARY OF APPLICATIONS TO LiDDELL
The five liability models offer a framework for categorizing and
analyzing the allegations presented in Liddell. Further, they reveal
the range of remedies that plaintiffs may obtain. As Liddell illus-
trates, the models also provide a means of evaluating the conse-
quences of the court's actions. As an application of the liability
models suggests, the omission of several government housing entities
from the Liddell case could diminish claimants' opportunities for
broad, flexible, and effective school and housing remedies.
CONCLUSION
School desegregation law is undergoing a significant evolution.
After several decades of separating school and housing cases, courts
now accept the interaction of school and housing segregation. Courts
assign liability to school and housing officials for the dual effects of
their discriminatory acts. Further, courts and litigants have found
364. See FED. R. Civ. P. 19 (1966 amend.) (court can conduct legally binding
adjudication only between the parties actually joined in the action). For example, in
Bell v. Board of Educ. (Akron), 491 F. Supp. 916, 942-43 (N.D. Ohio 1980), plaintiffs
stated that intentional discriminatory housing acts of government at all levels caused
residential segregation. This rendered resulting school segregation unconstitutional
and subject to remedy. The court, however, refused to work backward from the rem-
edy. Although plaintiffs believed they had shown constitutional housing violations at
all levels of government, they had not joined all the governmental actors as parties.
Citing FED. R. Civ. P. 19, the court stated it was without power to determine the
rights and obligations of parties not before it. Therefore, it refused to issue findings
concerning alleged discrimination of parties not represented. Plaintiffs had failed to
move to join additional parties. Despite the court's power to join additional parties at
its discretion, it did not. 491 F. Supp. at 942-43.
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new ways to justify dual school and housing remedies that reinforce
each other, rather than working at cross purposes. Courts now per-
mit plaintiffs to allege school and housing counts within a school de-
segregation case. Alternatively, plaintiffs may use three hybrid
liability models that may justify school and housing remedies. De-
spite potential problems in merging housing and school law, courts
may gain the- opportunity to fashion innovative remedies.
New theories of liability create new problems. When courts find
parties liable for segregative effects beyond their sphere of authority,
courts may have to require non-liable parties to participate in the
remedy. For example, a court may need a non-liable school board to
remedy the school effects of discriminatory housing acts by govern-
ment officials. In those cases, courts are requiring plaintiffs to prove
a causal relationship and quantify the segregative effects with con-
crete evidence. Thus plaintiffs and cross-complainants must present
a strong case to overcome judicial reluctance to impinge on the au-
tonomy of non-liable parties.
Vague liability standards and presumptions in school and housing
law cause additional problems in hybrid theories of liability. Perhaps
courts will eventually develop firmer standards for determining in-
tent and quantifying effects. Until that time, courts will continue to
exercise a great deal of discretion in determining, for example, when
effects are significant enough to warrant imposing an interdistrict
remedy.
New liability theories provide courts with a broader range of reme-
dies. The court may order traditional school remedies to redress the
school harm. Further, the court may order long term, slower housing
remedies that address problems of demographic shifts difficult for
school officials to control. Finally, courts may overcome problems
presented by complex interaction of housing and school segregation
by combining school and housing remedies. In addition, the court
may order affirmative relief, enjoin further discriminatory acts, or use
the threat of affirmative or injunctive action to stimulate voluntary
proposals. The court may also offer parties incentives to voluntarily
promote integration. New theories of liability therefore offer courts
the opportunity to provide comprehensive remedies with longer term
effects than earlier remedies.
These new liability theories fill a critical need by providing parties
and the courts with a framework to categorize and analyze defend-
ants' liability and the range of remedies. They also provide a means
[Vol. 23:111
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for evaluating the consequences of court orders or tactical decisions
by the parties. As school desegregation law continues to develop,
these models can provide a framework for analysis.
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